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 This thesis analyzes the “Rice Proposal”—Condoleezza Rice’s October 
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a long term policy goal for the Bush administration, by July 2001 President Bush and his 
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This thesis analyzes the “Rice Proposal,” a statement by Condoleezza Rice in 
October 2000 widely viewed as a Bush administration campaign promise to end U.S. 
ground force participation in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.  The thrust of her 
argument was that peacekeeping missions, especially those in the Balkans, are 
detrimental to U.S. military preparedness.  Rice contended that the role of the U.S. 
military should be solely to combat major threats around the world.  The thesis surveys 
the development of the Rice Proposal, which has remained an implicit policy goal of the 
Bush administration if not an actual policy, and examines the U.S. and NATO debates 
over the proposal. 
In the United States, some commentators have argued that the performance of 
peacekeeping missions does not prepare troops for combat, while others have contended 
that peacekeeping missions represent useful military training.  This argument is actually 
an extension of a larger dispute over the United States role in the world.  What principles 
and priorities should guide U.S. foreign policy?  Does the United States, as the world’s 
sole superpower, have an obligation to police the world, intervening against aggression 
and injustice?  Or should America restrain itself and act only when its interests are 
threatened?  The debate over the U.S. role in the world is closely related to one about the 
appropriate roles of the U.S. military.  Some Americans wonder if participation in small-
scale contingency operations is suitable to the current mission, training and structure of 
the U.S. military.   
The possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from participation in peacekeeping 
operations on the ground in the Balkans goes right to the heart of the NATO alliance.  It 
is cause for great concern among alliance members due to NATO’s evolving nature.  
NATO spent the 1990’s evolving from a purely collective defense organization to one 
that also undertakes missions in support of collective security on a selective basis; and the 
prospect of a U.S. withdrawal of ground forces from the very region that helped redefine 
NATO has seemed a betrayal to some Europeans.  The Rice Proposal’s “division of 
labor” would have European and Canadian troops doing all of the work on the ground in 
 xiv 
the Balkans while U.S. forces would provide intelligence and logistics support.  Such a 
division of labor could undermine risk sharing, which has been a guiding principle of 
NATO since its inception; if the United States is unwilling to place its troops at risk, the 
alliance’s political cohesion could suffer. 
NATO’s experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated that American 
strength and leadership are truly vital to NATO’s operations, but NATO’s European 
members will be unlikely to accept that leadership if the United States is unwilling to 
keep troops on the ground.  The timing of such a withdrawal appears inappropriate, 
because violence has resurged in the Balkans (notably in Macedonia) and the Bush 
administration’s shift in strategic interest from Europe to Asia has made Europeans 
nervous about the reliability of the U.S. commitment to NATO.  For these reasons and 
others, it seemed in July 2001 that the Bush administration had indefinitely postponed 
(and perhaps even discarded) the Rice Proposal.  The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
on the United States and the allied response have, however, caused it to resurface.  
The thesis determines that while the Rice Proposal apparently came about as a 
result of domestic politics, the violence in the Balkans, coupled with U.S. voter apathy 
and pressures within the NATO alliance, apparently led to its abandonment—at least 
until 11 September 2001.  The terrorist attacks have created more compelling reasons to 
transfer U.S. ground forces from the Balkans to other purposes.  The thesis concludes 
with a recommendation that such a shift not be pursued, in the interests of maintaining 
NATO’s political cohesion, U.S. leadership in the alliance, and political-military stability 














I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
A. PURPOSE   
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the “Rice Proposal,” a statement by 
Condoleezza Rice in October 2000 widely viewed as a Bush campaign promise to end the 
U.S. military presence in the Balkans.  This proposal raised contentious issues. 
Commentators in the United States and abroad described the proposal as something that 
could destroy the United States relationship with Europe.  
B. THE RICE PROPOSAL  
On the campaign trail, Governor George W. Bush, the Republican presidential 
nominee, drew attention to differences between his policies and those of his rival, Vice 
President Al Gore, the Democratic nominee.  To this end, his security advisor, 
Condoleeza Rice, gave an interview on 20 October 2000 that spelled out Bush’s vision on 
the use of the military.  The thrust of her argument was that peacekeeping missions, 
especially those in the Balkans, are detrimental to U.S. military preparedness.   
The governor is talking about a new division of labor.  The United States 
is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind 
of forces that is needed to protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the 
Taiwan Straits.  And extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness 
for these kinds of global missions.1   
Rice contended that the role of the U.S. military should be solely to combat major 
threats around the world. 
This comes down to function…. Carrying out civil administration and 
police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do 
the things that America has to do.  We don’t need to have the 82nd 
Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.2   
According to Rice, the United States would provide logistic and intelligence 
support, but European forces should provide the ground troops for peacekeeping 
operations in Europe.  This shift would allow the United States to prepare for the major 
conflicts that may demand U.S. military action.  This proposal has subsequently been 
                                                 
1 Condoleezza Rice quoted in Michael R. Gordon, “Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping In Balkan 
Fights,” The New York Times, 21 October 2000, p. A1. 
2 Ibid. 
2 
modified, but it retained its basic form at the time of George W. Bush’s inauguration as 
president in January 2001, and it has become a major point of contention in both the 
United States and Europe. 
C. THE DOMESTIC DEBATE 
In the United States, the debate has concerned the question of preparedness.  
Some commentators have argued that the performance of peacekeeping missions does not 
prepare troops for combat.  From this perspective, a tour in the Balkans degrades a unit’s 
ability to accomplish combat missions.  According to Jeff Le Roy, a U.S. soldier who 
served in the Balkans,  
For the most part, American soldiers do nothing but sit in our base camps 
and play video games and sports, trying to occupy the huge quantities of 
free time and boredom.  We cannot train or practice warfighting and, as a 
result, our skills seriously erode.  We proved this when we returned home 
and needed an eight-month retraining period before we could be certified 
as combat ready for war.3 
Others have contended, however, that peacekeeping missions represent useful 
military training.  Such missions are certain to be more numerous in the future, they 
argue, and service in the Balkans could enable U.S. troops to develop the skills necessary 
to respond to such contingencies.  In this sense, Balkan peacekeeping might actually 
improve readiness.   
This argument is actually an extension of a wider debate about the United States 
role in the world that has occupied pundits for years.  Should the United States try to 
police the world?  Is America morally obligated to send troops all over the world in 
defense of human rights?  In late 1995, when the Dayton Accords were negotiated, the 
military and the public were wary of an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, 
especia lly in an area where the conflict seemed so intractable.  To reassure these groups, 
the Clinton administration placed a time limit on U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia.  As 
Steve Chapman has noted, “When Clinton sent those troops to Bosnia, Americans were 
assured that their presence would not be required on a permanent basis.”4  Indeed, 
President Clinton said that the conditions created by IFOR would 
                                                 
3 Jeff Le Roy, “Priorities Are Misplaced In The Balkans,” USA Today, 26 October 2000, p.15. 
4 Steve Chapman, “Should We Be In The Balkans Forever?”  Chicago Tribune, 26 October 2000. 
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help to create a secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can return 
to their homes, vote in free elections and begin to rebuild their lives.  Our 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission should and will take 
about one year.5   
Some decry the fact that U.S. troops are still in the Balkans, but others applaud it, 
and are unconcerned by such long-term commitments.  
 The Rice Proposal can be seen as an extension of the Powell Doctrine, which is 
actually a variant of the Weinberger Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine holds that, when 
considering the use of U.S. forces abroad, U.S. leaders must abide by the following 
principles:  
(1) Commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake.  (2) If we 
commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win.  (3) Go in only with 
clear political and military objectives.  (4) Be ready to change the 
commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still.  (5) 
Only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American 
people and the Congress.  (6) Commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.6   
This became known as the Powell Doctrine because of General Colin Powell’s 
firm espousal of its tenets, and because of his insistence on “overwhelming and 
decisive”7 force in any test of arms involving the U.S. military.  Some contend that this 
approach implies a limited role for the United States armed forces in most military 
conflicts.  That is, the United States would take a selective approach to committing its 
forces, and would avoid involvement in conflicts peripheral to its interests.  The U.S. 
military role would be limited to intelligence and support functions in such cases.  Critics 
of the Powell Doctrine contend that the types of major conflict for which the doctrine 
seems suited are not characteristic of modern conflict.  In this view, the Powell Doctrine 
consists of lessons learned from old wars that will never be fought again.  As a part of its 
analysis of the U.S. debate, the thesis reviews indications that divisions within the Bush 
administration on these issues may be present, with Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell 
                                                 
5 President Clinton’s remarks on Bosnia, transcript in The New York Times, 28 November 1995, p. A6, 
quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998), 219. 
6 Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 303.  
7 Colin Powell quoted in   “Powell Discusses With Senators His Views On Using Force,” The Buffalo 
News, 18 January 2001, p. A4. 
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on one side in seeming opposition to the views favored by such figures as Dick Cheney.  
U.S. opinion leaders (politicians, officials, journalists, experts and others) are certainly 
divided on these issues, and the U.S. internal debate will have a great impact on the final 
outcome. 
D. THE EUROPEAN DEBATE  
The European debate will also have a significant impact on U.S. decision-making.  
When the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991, Yugoslavia’s disintegration supplied NATO 
with a new mission.  Rather than opposing a monolithic enemy, NATO would now be the 
means by which European stability would be assured.  The European Union’s initial steps 
in the Balkans were faltering and ineffectual, and it ultimately took United States 
leadership and presence to bring some modicum of stability to the region.  
Many Europeans within and outside NATO nations were appalled that the United 
States would consider withdrawing its ground forces from the peacekeeping missions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, after having led the processes that stabilized the Balkans.  Part of 
this sentiment is based on the desire to see all members of the Atlantic Alliance share the 
risks and responsibilities–the basis of America’s relationship with its European allies for 
the last fifty years.  To pull U.S. troops out of the Balkans just as tensions are starting to 
mount again, notably on the Kosovo-Macedonia frontier, would be a serious blow to that 
relationship.  European officials said in October 2000 that the Rice Proposal  
could divide the NATO alliance, undermine the current European effort to 
increase its military capacity and question the postwar rationale for 
NATO’s existence, which has revolved around the Balkans.8   
Many Europeans also believe that European NATO members are simply not 
capable of handling the challenges without the United States, and point to the history of 
the Balkan conflict as evidence. 
Another argument centers on timing.  Slobodan Milosevic, the person widely 
regarded as responsible for the decade of violence in the Balkans, had just been deposed 
in October 2000, and a new and promising democratic regime led by Vojislav Kostunica 
was taking his place.  Was that truly the proper time for the United States to begin 
                                                 
8 Steven Erlanger, “Europeans Say Bush’s Pledge To Pull Out Of Balkans Could Split NATO,” The 
New York Times, 25 October 2000. 
5 
discussions about withdrawing its troops?  Critics argued that such a move could 
destabilize the Yugoslav regime at a delicate time in its evolution as a Western-oriented 
democracy.  Others are worried about how relations with the Russian troops in SFOR and 
KFOR would be managed without the participation of U.S. troops.  Russia does not 
willingly submit to the authority of the NATO command structure, and prefers to deal 
with U.S. authorities. 
Another issue at stake is the looming question of missile defense, a cause célèbre 
that has agitated many Europeans, Russians and Chinese.  President Bush’s plans for 
missile defense would require the United States to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty or work with Russia to amend that treaty or negotiate a new agreed 
framework.  This move has caused consternation, as the ABM Treaty has often been cited 
as the cornerstone of strategic stability during the last thirty years.  It can be argued that 
redefining the military modalities of U.S. commitments in the Balkans is not the best way 
to garner support for such a huge departure from established treaty frameworks for 
strategic relations between Moscow and Washington.  The European debate is complex 
and wide-ranging, and will greatly affect America’s ultimate decision.  
E. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis utilizes both primary and secondary sources, with an emphasis on 
current news and interviews, as the debate is still ongoing.  The thesis is organized in the 
following manner:  Chapter Two examines the Rice Proposal itself, its origins, and its 
evolution up to the present.  Chapter Three reviews the debate in the United States.  
Chapter Four analyzes the debate in Europe, most notably in NATO countries, but also in 
key non-NATO countries.  Chapter Five assesses the impact of both domestic and 

















II. U.S. BALKAN PRESENCE AND THE RICE PROPOSAL  
 
 
This chapter sets the stage for an analysis of the political dynamics determining 
the fate of the Rice Proposal by examining the origins of the U.S. military presence in the 
Balkans.  It considers the breakup of the former Republic of Yugoslavia before turning to 
the U.S. presidential campaign of 2000, in which the Rice Proposal first emerged.  It 
considers the forces that may have influenced the proposal’s genesis, and then examines 
the evolution of the proposal throughout the campaign and the initial months of the Bush 
administration, setting out the facts that later chapters interpret. 
A. THE BALKAN CONFLICT  
This thesis begins its analysis of the Balkan conflicts in the late 1980’s, when 
Serb nationalism was once again on the rise.  In 1987, the Serb Academy of Arts and 
Sciences published its Memorandum, which asserted that “over the last 20 years 200,000 
Serbs had already been ‘forced to leave ’ Kosovo.”9  The Memorandum further stated that 
“the physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo 
and Metohija is a worse historical defeat than any experienced in the liberation wars 
waged by Serbia.”10  The force of Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito’s personality had 
largely held ethnic strife among the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in check, but the years 
after his death in 1980 saw a rise in nationalist sentiment.  The Serb Academy’s 
Memorandum was a stark and powerful expression of this sentiment, and served to 
galvanize Serb opinion. 
Initially, the Yugoslav communist leadership condemned the Memorandum, and 
Serb Communist Party leader Slobodan Milosevic said it represented “nothing else but 
the darkest nationalism.”11  After his denunciation of the Memorandum, Serb President 
Ivan Stambolic asked Milosevic to go to Kosovo in June 1987 to quell unrest, and 
prevent Serb protesters from carrying their battle to Belgrade.  While witnessing a clash 
between Kosovo police and protesting Serbs, Milosevic apparently had a change of heart.  
                                                 
9 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997), p. 158. 
10 Ibid., p. 159. 
11 Milosevic quoted in ibid., p. 160. 
8 
He yelled out to the protesting Serbs, “no one should dare beat you.”12  With this 
sentence, Milosevic became a champion of Serb nationalism, which he exploited to 
garner support for his own political agenda.  He soon consolidated power in Serbia, 
becoming president in 1989.  On the way, he used his new influence to amend the 
Yugoslav constitution, revoking the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; to place 
loyalists at the head of the Serb media; and to launch a propaganda blitz that glorified the 
Serbs and demonized the other ethnic groups in the Balkans.  He appeared to be moving 
ever closer to establishing a Serb-run Yugoslavia.13 
In June 1989, after becoming president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic presented 
himself as the savior of all Serbs in a ceremony at Kosovo Polje, known as the “Field of 
Blackbirds.”  28 June 1989 marked the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of 
Kosovo.  It was on this day in 1389 that Serb Prince Lazar suffered a “glorious defeat” in 
his struggle against the invading Ottomans.  Lodestones in the Serb national psyche, 
Kosovo Polje and the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo provided the perfect backdrop 
for Milosevic to whip the million-strong audience into a nationalist frenzy.  He warned 
them that, once again, they were beset by enemies.  “Six centuries later, again we are in 
battles and quarrels.  They are not armed battles, though such things cannot be excluded 
yet.”14 
Soon enough, armed battles came about, when both Croatia and Slovenia declared 
their independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991.  Milosevic, as the Serb president in 
a Serb-dominated military and federal structure, was able to essentially dictate the actions 
of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).15  The JNA waged a short- lived war against 
Slovenia, which had a small Serb minority, but the conflict in Croatia turned out to be 
more difficult.  Serbs in Croatia, inflamed by Serb nationalist rhetoric and alarmed by the 
rise of Croatian nationalism (including the revival of the World War II Croatian flag, 
used by the Croatian Ustashas who persecuted Serbs during the war), began fighting to 
remain a part of Yugoslavia.  The violence lasted until January 1992, when the member 
                                                 
12 Milosevic quoted in ibid., p. 162. 
13 Ibid., pp.162-164. 
14 Milosevic quoted in ibid., p. 164. 
15 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 225. 
9 
states of the European Community recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, 
and the United Nations (UN) was able to negotiate a peace settlement.  Encouraged by 
the independence of Croatia, Bosnia held a referendum on independence on 29 February 
1992.  The result was overwhelmingly for independence (without the votes of the 
Bosnian Serbs, who boycotted the referendum), and this led to an immediate declaration 
of independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.16  The result was a complex 
conflict among the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia–with the  participation of 
Zagreb and Belgrade–that lasted until the Dayton Accords of November 1995. 
The initial responses by external powers to this conflict were limited.  In 
September 1991, the UN Security Council (UNSC) placed an arms embargo on the whole 
of Yugoslavia, one which continued after the Croatian conflict had ended and the 
Bosnian conflict had begun.   
Although the UN itself recognized Bosnia and admitted it as a member-
state distinct and separate from Yugoslavia on 22 May 1992, it continued 
to apply the embargo as if nothing had changed.17   
Noel Malcolm writes that the “biggest single contribution by the West to the 
destruction of Bosnia” was its continued enforcement of this embargo.18  The Bosnian 
Serbs had access to the arms and resources provided by the JNA, were continually being 
supplied by Belgrade, and held territory with many arms factories, while the Bosniaks–
also known as Bosnian Muslims– were basically unarmed.   
The external response extended to supporting UNSC resolutions condemning the 
violence, then to sanctions with UNSC Resolution 757(1992) on 30 May 1992.  This 
resolution applied “wide-ranging sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
[meaning Serbia and Montenegro].”19  These economic sanctions did not settle the 
conflict.  After UN representative Cyrus Vance was able to negotiate a peace settlement 
in Croatia, the Security Council established a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 233. 
17 Ibid., p. 243. 
18 Ibid., p. 242. 
19“United Nations Protection Force: Background,” p. 5. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_bhtm. 
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UN Resolution 743 in February 1992.  Its goal was to “create the condition of peace and 
security required for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.”20  UNPROFOR’s 
mandate was gradually expanded after hostilities intensified in Bosnia, and UNPROFOR 
units became responsible for ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance “to 
Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia.”21  While performing this 
mission, UNPROFOR troops were to follow normal peacekeeping rules of engagement, 
which authorized them to use force only in self-defense.22   
Later UNSC resolutions also demanded that ethnic cleansing be stopped, 
established a no-fly zone over Bosnia, and created “safe areas” in which UN troops were 
supposed to guarantee the safety of a city’s residents.  As the conflict wore on, however, 
the Serbs continued to conduct ethnic cleansing and to violate “safe areas.”  By January 
1993, the no-fly zone had been violated on nearly four hundred occasions.23 
UN diplomacy created a “doctrine of equivalence–an assumption that all parties 
to a conflict must be treated equally, with prima facie rights and claims.”24  This ensured 
that the Bosniaks, despite a massive military inferiority, enjoyed no special consideration 
from UNPROFOR.  This neutrality had the effect of favoring the Serbs, since the 
weakness of the UN forces and the “doctrine of equivalence” denied them the option of 
effectively enforcing their narrowly circumscribed mandates in the face of Serb 
opposition.  According to David Rieff,  
the defining moment of the war was when a UN spokesman told a 
Sarajevo press conference that a cease-fire had been agreed to and he 
wanted to thank the Serbs for their cooperation.  The next moment 
everyone was knocked to the floor by incoming Serb artillery rounds.25   
This type of event was typical of the first years of the war, as Serb forces flouted the no-
fly zone, attacked “safe areas” and massacred the residents, and even murdered Bosnian 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 2. 
21 Ibid., p. 5. 
22 Ibid., p. 5. 
23 Ibid., p. 9. 
24 Noel Malcolm, “Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure,” The National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 5.  
25 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1995), p. 194. 
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officials who were being escorted by UN representatives.26  This inaction continued even 
after the evidence in the summer of 1992 of crimes against humanity such as those 
committed in the detention camp at Omarska.27 
B. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS  
The United States role was initially defined by the Bush administration. As the 
conflict broke out, President Bush said,  
I don’t care what the political pressures are.  Before one soldier…is 
committed to battle, I’m going to know how that person gets out of there.  
And we are not going to get bogged down into some guerrilla warfare.  
We lived through that once.28   
Unconvinced regarding a compelling U.S. interest in the region, President Bush refused 
to send in forces.  He did recognize that antagonisms in certain parts of the Balkans were 
extremely volatile, and could lead to wider conflict.  In December 1992, with this in 
mind, President Bush issued the so-called “Christmas Warning.”  In a letter to President 
Milosevic, President Bush warned that “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by 
Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the 
Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.”29  This warning was repeated in March 1993, 
just after President Clinton took office, when Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
stated, “we remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of conflict in 
Kosovo caused by Serb action. ”30  Aside from this rhetoric, however, the successive U.S. 
administrations did little until 1995.   
To be fair to the Bush administration, it should be noted that the European 
Community was not inclined to have the United States enter the conflict.   
Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques Poos, speaking as chairman of the 
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EC Council of Ministers (composed of the foreign ministers of all the EC 
countries), said that it was “the hour of Europe,” and that “if one problem 
can be solved by Europeans, it’s the Yugoslav problem.  This is a 
European country and it’s not up to the Americans and not up to anybody 
else.”31   
President Bush was content to let the Europeans handle the problem; but, as evidence of 
atrocities surfaced, others were not.  In 1992, the Democratic presidential candidate, Bill 
Clinton, demanded that “the administration push NATO to send fighter bombers to save 
Bosnians from ‘deliberate and systematic extermination based on their ethnic origin.’”32  
Yet, after reaching office, President Clinton did no thing substantive to stop this genocide.  
In the spring of 1993 he sent his Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to meet with 
European leaders and propose “lift and strike” policies– to lift the arms embargo and to 
conduct air strikes against the Bosnian Serb forces–but the Europeans, who had troops on 
the ground in UNPROFOR that could suffer reprisals, refused to endorse these policies.  
The United States and the other NATO allies gradually accepted responsibility for 
enforcing the arms embargo and the no-fly zone, but U.S. leadership was still absent, and 
the violence continued. 
When Serb shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace (a so-called “safe area”) resulted 
in the death of sixty-eight people on 6 February 1994, NATO was finally pushed into 
action.  NATO planes shot down four Serb aircraft that were violating the no-fly zone.  
This was the alliance’s first use of deadly force, but it did little to stem the tide of 
violence.  In July 1995, the Serbs began to shell other “safe areas” in earnest, and 
massacred thousands of Muslim men in Srebrenica.  This atrocity (among other factors) 
seems to have finally convinced Western leaders, including U.S. President Bill Clinton, 
that serious action needed to be taken. 33  On 30 August 1995, NATO forces resolutely 
began attacking Serb positions, and continued until 14 September.34  This action, coupled 
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with a Croatian-Muslim ground offensive, created the necessary conditions for peace 
talks in Dayton, Ohio. 
Forces from many countries, including several NATO members, participated in 
UNPROFOR.  After the Dayton Accords, NATO led both the UNSC-authorized 
Implementation Force (IFOR) that assumed UNPROFOR’s responsibilities in the 
Balkans and its successor after one year, the UNSC-authorized Stabilization Force 
(SFOR).   The United States was the largest force provider for IFOR, supplying 16,200 
troops in Bosnia and an additional 6,000 troops stationed outside Bosnia to support 
IFOR.35  SFOR replaced IFOR a year later, and U.S. troop levels had been reduced to 
8,500.36  By 31 December 2000, that number had been further reduced to 4,125, and the 
most recent reductions have resulted in a presence of about 3,500 troops.37  
On 24 March 1999, after a year of escalating Serb atrocities in Kosovo–the results 
of federal “crackdowns” on Kosovar Albanians that led to thousands of civilian deaths 
and hundreds of thousands of refugees–NATO conducted Operation Allied Force.38  
After years of inaction, NATO leaders seemed to have come to the conclusion that the 
unrest in the Balkans required swift and unified action.  Initially predicted to be a short 
campaign, as with Operation Deliberate Force in the Bosnia conflict, Operation Allied 
Force rained bombs on Serbia for eleven weeks.  Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic 
finally capitulated and signed a military-technical agreement with NATO, which was 
endorsed by UNSC Resolution 1244.39  NATO led and supplied troops for the UNSC-
authorized Kosovo Force (KFOR), beginning in June 1999.   
As with the conclusion of the Bosnian conflict, U.S. forces have played a crucial 
role in KFOR.  In addition to providing invaluable command and control assets, the 
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United States has supplied approximately 6,000 troops in the form of a mechanized 
infantry division.  These troops have remained in Kosovo, patrolling the U.S. sector (with 
four other sectors being patrolled by British, French, German, and Italian forces) and 
working to pacify and stabilize the region. 40 
C. THE RICE PROPOSAL  
Until the U.S. presidential race of 2000, the general expectation within the 
Alliance was that U.S. participation in SFOR and KFOR would be of indefinite, and  
probably prolonged, duration.  However, one of Governor Bush’s primary campaign 
issues was the state of the U.S. military.  He stated that  
the current administration inherited a military ready for the dangers and 
challenges facing our nation.  The next president will inherit a military in 
decline….  If called on by the commander- in-chief today, two entire 
divisions of the army would have to report “not ready for duty, sir.”41   
He contended that the current state of the military was a result of President 
Clinton’s overextension, and vowed to be more circumspect when it came to committing 
U.S. troops.42   
Governor Bush returned to the issue of the military in the second presidential 
debate on 12 October 2000.  When moderator Jim Lehrer brought up the Balkans, Bush 
said,  
I’d very much like to get our troops out of there…. I recognize we can’t do 
it now, nor do I advocate an immediate withdrawal.  That would be an 
abrogation of our agreement with NATO.43   
This was a relatively innocuous statement–offensive to nobody.  But when 
Governor Bush uttered his next sentence, he stepped into different territory: “But I think 
it ought to be one of our priorities to work with our European friends to convince them to 
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put troops on the ground.”44  This remark gave the impression that he misunderstood the 
make-up of NATO forces in the Balkans, since the United States supplied only about 
11,400 troops out of the total NATO presence of about  65,000.45  This debate supplied 
Bush with some credibility, because he fared better than expected in foreign policy; but 
his remark about the Balkans left many questions unanswered. 
In the next presidential debate, on 17 October 2000, Governor Bush added that in 
his administration  
the mission of the United States military will be to be prepared and ready 
to fight and win war, and therefore prevent war from happening in the first 
place.  There may be some moments when we use our troops as 
peacekeepers, but not often. 46   
This statement, coupled with those from the previous debate, raised the question 
of what exactly a Bush foreign policy might look like. 
On 20 October 2000, Governor Bush’s security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, 
provided a vision of that potential policy in an interview with The New York Times.  To 
tie up the threads of Governor Bush’s comments, she said that 
The Governor is talking about a new division of labor.  The United States 
is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind 
of force that is needed to protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the 
Taiwan Straits.  And extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness 
for these kinds of missions.47  
The solution, she said, was for the Europeans to take up a greater share of the 
peacekeeping burden.  She added that  
the United States would continue to provide intelligence, help with 
communications, transport and do other logistical work after withdrawing 
its peacekeeping troops.48   
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And, lest anyone get the impression that Bush would abandon America’s European allies, 
she said that 
We are not withdrawing from Europe…We are not withdrawing the kind 
of support we can provide, like air power.  But when it comes to nation-
building or civilian administration or indefinite peacekeeping, we do need 
for the Europeans to step up to their responsibilities.  We are not going to 
do anything precipitous, but unless we set this as a firm goal we will never 
get it done.49 
This interview introduced the Rice Proposal to the world, and the response was 
immediate.  President Clinton’s Chief of Staff, John Podesta, called it a “stunning about-
face from the U.S. leadership of our NATO mission in the Balkans.”50  Vice President Al 
Gore, the Democratic presidential candidate, called the proposal a “big mistake,” and 
went on to say that it was a “breathtakingly short-sighted view of America’s role in the 
world” that was “based on a profoundly flawed understanding of what NATO is all 
about.”51  European leaders also responded rapidly, and were aghast at the prospect of 
America’s withdrawal from the Balkans.  As Lawrence Kaplan described it, “the 
Europeans went ballistic.”52   
Such a torrent of negative response demanded some sort of amplification or 
clarification.  In late October 2000, nervous European speculation finally resulted in a 
phone call to the Bush headquarters from NATO headquarters.   
Bush campaign staff said Stephen Hadley, a senior defense adviser to the 
Republican candidate, received a call last week from NATO staff, which 
led to a discussion between him and Lord Robertson, NATO’s secretary 
general.  In the conversation, Mr. Hadley “reiterated and reinforced 
Governor Bush’s long-held positions supporting NATO’s actions in the 
Balkans.”53   
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Lord Robertson was “left with the impression that, if elected, Mr. Bush is prepared to 
move slowly on the issue of Balkan peacekeeping to avoid any early political crises with 
NATO.”54  Hadley reinforced this argument by pointing out that Bush had actually 
helped President Clinton in May 2000 with his opposition to the Byrd-Warner bill.55  
This bill would have required the president to certify to Congress that the other NATO 
allies were meeting their commitments in Kosovo, and would have required 
Congressional approval to continue the U.S. troop presence in Kosovo beyond 1 July 
2001.56  
This seeming step backwards from the edge served to quiet some fears, but the 
questions persisted.  In mid-November 2000, Condoleezza Rice, speaking at a conference 
on U.S. priorities for a 21st century security strategy, said that “‘we have got to take a 
hard look at the resources we are providing and the missions we are taking on’ in Kosovo 
and elsewhere.”57  She added that it might be necessary to set up international police 
forces to perform peacekeeping duties.58  These statements served to bring the proposal 
back to the spotlight, renewing fears of a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. 
These fears were calmed in December 2000 by General Colin Powell.  When 
President-elect Bush announced Colin Powell as his selection for Secretary of State, 
Powell held a press conference to discuss the future Bush administration’s foreign policy.   
Powell said the Bush administration planned to look at deployments in 
Bosnia and Kosovo and other overseas locations “and make sure those 
deployments are proper….Our armed forces are stretched rather thin, and 
there is a limit to how many of these deployments we can sustain.”   
Powell said the Bush administration would consult allies to see how U.S. 
soldiers deployed overseas on various peacekeeping missions could be 
replaced.  “We’re not cutting and running,” cautioned Powell, “we’re 
going to make a careful assessment of it in consultation with our allies, 
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and then make some judgments after that assessment is completed.”59 
The delivery of such a message, from such a respected and experienced person, 
helped to allay fears.  Powell’s remarks were followed a few days later by statements 
from Condoleezza Rice that President Bush would respect U.S. obligations to the allies, 
and that nothing “will be done one-sidedly and without the consultation with the 
European allies.”60  Rice even denied that Bush ever contemplated a withdrawal from 
Balkan peacekeeping commitments.61   
With this soothing policy message, the Bush administration was able to calm fears 
through the period leading up to the inauguration.  When asked just before the 
inauguration if he planned on pulling out troops immediately after taking office, he 
answered, “No, I’m not.”62  He pledged that “he would consider any reduction in US 
peacekeeping troops in the Balkans only after careful review and consultation with allies 
in Europe.”63  This sentiment was echoed in February 2001 by Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld at the 37th Munich Conference on Security Policy, when he told his fellow 
ministers that the United States would “not act unilaterally, or fail to consult our allies.”64  
Secretary of State Colin Powell also declared in February 2001 that “there is no exit date 
for the whole force either in Bosnia or in Kosovo.  Those will be long-term 
commitments.”65  Powell added that the United States would “‘avoid any steps that 
would jeopardize’ the alliance’s unity.”66   
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Yet, on 14 March, CBS Evening News reported that the United States was 
beginning its withdrawal from the Balkans. 
Taking its first concrete steps toward pulling American forces out of the 
Balkans, the Bush administration has developed a plan that would cut back 
the 4,400 U.S. troops still in Bosnia by about 80 percent.  The plan does 
not affect the 5,600 U.S. troops next door in Kosovo….  Under the Bush 
administration plan, troops would turn the labor- intensive job of 
conducting daily foot patrols to keep the streets safe over to civilian police 
and would only be responsible for preventing an outbreak of fighting….  
U.S. officials say that would allow the Pentagon to cut the number of 
American troops in Bosnia in half.  That would be followed by another cut 
to roughly 1,000 American troops who would serve only as monitors, 
watching for any signs of a resurgence of ethnic violence.  Officials say 
the timing of this phased withdrawal would depend on events, but it could 
begin at once with the pullout of an 800-man force, including Apache 
helicopters, and be completed within two years.67  
This report was accompanied by the beginning of a force reduction from 4,400 
troops to 3,500.  U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley 
said that the reduction was part of a six-month review that was concluded in December 
2000, and that the decision to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Bosnia was also made 
in December 2000.68  The timing of the force reduction, so soon after American 
assurances, raised once again the specter of the Rice Proposal. 
In response, the Bush administration denied that this reduction was part of an 
overall plan to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Bosnia.69  The troop withdrawal was 
characterized as merely the removal of non-essential personnel, and it was performed 
with the consent of NATO allies.  It did not imply that the United States was abandoning 
the Balkans.  The media, however, saw the move as a portent of things to come, and there 
was much speculation as to the next United States move.70 
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This move came, once again, in the form of a declaration by Secretary of State 
Colin Powell.  In a demonstration of U.S. commitment to the Balkans, Secretary Powell 
attended the April 2001 meeting of the Balkan Contact Group.  The Contact Group was 
established in 1994, and is made up of representatives of the United States, France, 
Britain, Italy, Germany, and Russia.  At the Contact Group meeting in Paris, Secretary 
Powell placed the administration’s most recent moves into perspective. 
We are constantly reviewing our troop levels in both SFOR and 
KFOR….The United States has made some reductions recently to bring us 
down to authorized levels, and we are constantly talking to our friends in 
NATO and others who are present in the region to see how best to perform 
the mission.  But there is no end point….  We are looking for 
opportunities to draw down, but not for opportunities to bail out.71 
Secretary Powell’s next move was to visit the Balkans and to reassure the regional 
governments that the United States is committed to fulfilling its political-military 
obligations in the area.  In Macedonia, the focal point of the most recent troubles, he told 
President Boris Trajkovsky, “you can be sure of American support of your efforts–
political support, economic support, and military support.”72   
With these last statements, the Rice Proposal might seem to be finished.  Rice’s 
initial proposal was seemingly incendiary, and was widely interpreted to mean the end of 
U.S. ground force involvement in the Balkans.  This was mostly because of the phrase 
“new division of labor,” and because of Governor Bush’s insistence that the U.S. military 
be used to fight wars, not to conduct peacekeeping operations.  The immediate outcry 
caused Bush to reaffirm his support for the U.S. role in fulfilling NATO’s obligations in 
the Balkans.   
Periodically, though, both as Governor and as President, George W. Bush has 
expressed a preference for the reduction of U.S. ground forces in the Balkans, and the 
outcry has resumed.  One could view this cycle as “flip-flopping” on a sensitive issue, but 
in fact the history of the issue shows that the Rice Proposal has been relatively consistent.  
President Bush and his advisors would evidently prefer to reduce the U.S. troop presence 
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in the Balkans.  In the face of European resistance, they have stated and restated their 
commitment to NATO and to the Balkans, but the goal has remained.  The Bush 
administration has indeed begun to reduce the number of troops in the Balkans, and is  
seeking ways to continue this reduction.  While these steps do not reflect the immediate 
ground force pullout that many feared when the Rice Proposal was first advanced, the 
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III. THE DOMESTIC DEBATE 
 
 
This chapter surveys the domestic debate over the U.S. military presence in the 
Balkans.  Specifically, it looks at the issues of readiness, the U.S. role in the world, and 
the proper role of the U.S. military. 
A. MILITARY READINESS  
Military readiness is a key issue in the domestic debate over the Rice Proposal.  
One of the primary elements of Condoleezza Rice’s argument against U.S. participation 
in peacekeeping operations was that they detract from readiness to conduct the large-
scale operations for which the U.S. military is designed.73  In this sentiment, Rice is not 
alone.  Her views are shared by soldiers such as Lieutenant Daniel Mauro, U.S. Army, 
who wrote in the New York Times,  
As an Army officer serving in Kosovo, I can tell you from firsthand 
experience that our operations in the Balkans are extremely damaging to 
our ability to survive and succeed in combat.74   
Every day spent in the Balkans is a day in which soldiers cannot train in such areas as 
large unit coordination and combined operations.  Soldiers engaged in peacekeeping 
often carry live ammunition, but seldom have the opportunity to train with their weapons.  
There are shooting ranges available, and plenty of ammunition, but soldiers rarely have 
the time to practice between their patrols.75  For those who need to practice with large 
weapons such as .50 caliber guns or mortars, there are no ranges.  A tour in the Balkans 
for many soldiers means a complete absence of some vital training.76   
For others, Kosovo supplies what troops deem to be unnecessary training.  Staff 
Sergeant Christopher Callan of the 1st Infantry Divisions said, “I was trained as an 
infantryman, not to apprehend robbers or stop traffic accidents, which is what I do day-
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to-day in Kosovo.”77  Work assignments are even less satisfying for those who pull duty 
inside the base camps, according to an Army special forces major:  
Guys on the base camps had a Ground Hog Day mentality.  Susie gas 
pumper put on her body armor, helmet, and weapon (with no ammo) every 
day, walked in the mud to her filling station, stayed there for several 
hours, then went back to the rack.78   
Other day-to-day missions involve standing guard at churches, watching the traffic pass, 
or patrolling remote outposts; and much of a soldier’s time is spent playing cards.79   
The inevitable result of (a) the inability to conduct traditional training and 
exercises and (b) the execution of routine domestic-order tasks is a reduction in unit 
readiness to conduct war.  According to a Congressional Budget Office study published 
in December 1999, “surveys of Army leaders who took part in peace operations suggest a 
drop in training readiness for conventional war after participation in peace operations.”80  
U.S. Representative Ander Crenshaw (R-FL) wrote,  
Indeed, earlier this year [2001], the Army rated the readiness status of the 
3rd Infantry Division at the second-lowest level because its role in the 
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia prevented…maintaining its combat 
proficiency. 81   
Recognition of current readiness problems extends to the highest levels of the military 
chain of command, and was even acknowledged by General Henry Shelton, then 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in September 2000,  
Our forces are showing increasing signs of serious wear.  Anecdotal, 
initially, and now measurable evidence, indicates that our readiness is 
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fraying and that the long-term health of the total force is in jeopardy. 82 
General Shelton did not attribute this problem solely to peacekeeping.  Reductions in 
force size, shrinking defense budgets, and ageing equipment have taken their toll; but 
peacekeeping has certainly contributed to it. 
It is arguable that with fewer than 10,000 U.S. soldiers in the Balkans, the impact 
on overall readiness is minimal; but the impact is not felt only by those deployed.   
“[O]ur research suggests that the costs are significantly higher than the 
relatively small number of troops involved would imply,” says Thomas 
McNaugher, deputy director of Army studies at [the] RAND Corp.  
Because the army has to cherry-pick specialized units from all over its 
force structure to augment its major peacekeeping forces…such operations 
tend to break up the established hierarchy of the Army, which is still 
organized around combat divisions and the conventional warfighting 
mission. 83 
When one segment of a unit is detached and sent to Kosovo, it means that both 
the segment and the parent unit are unable to perform certain large-scale training events, 
bringing overall readiness down.    
Additionally, the cost of peacekeeping operations can affect the combat readiness 
of troops back in garrison, including units that do not supply soldiers for deployment on 
peacekeeping missions.  Even prior to the U.S. deployment of peacekeepers in the 
Balkans, members of Congress were raising questions about peacekeeping missions.   
By using Pentagon accounts to pay for the invasion of Haiti and other 
unplanned operations, Republicans contend, peacekeeping is reducing 
military readiness by giving Congress little choice but to approve funding 
for missions already underway…. Training accounts were so low last fall 
[1994], said Representative Ron Weldon, R-PA, that 600 troops from the 
2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood near Killeen, Texas, were walking 
across fields pretending to be tanks because there wasn’t enough money 
for fuel and maintenance.84 
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The adverse effects of peacekeeping operations on readiness appear to be 
recognized throughout the military.  To refute these assertions, though, others point to 
evidence suggesting that peacekeeping missions have not taken too much of a toll. 
About 350 soldiers, most from the 1st AD [Armored Division], are 
participating in the [Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps] 
exercise.  The division is currently commanding the Kosovo Force 
peacekeeping mission and participating in other international training 
events.  But even though the division is a bit spread out, it hasn’t affected 
its ability to participate in this exercise.  [Major General George W.] 
Casey, [Jr.] said specialists and sergeants have been able to complete tasks 
during this mission usually handled by captains and majors.85 
In other words, if U.S. soldiers can still participate effectively in routine training 
exercises with foreign armies, their readiness must not be severely impaired. 
Many others see positive results for U.S. military readiness from peacekeeping 
missions.  While there are certainly many repetitive and unexciting jobs to be performed 
in the Balkans, there are also missions that utilize a soldier’s training.   
Peacekeeping in Kosovo not only means staffing checkpoints and 
escorting frightened Serbian civilians to market, schools, and hospitals in 
Albanian areas.  It also involves armed patrols along the rugged boundary 
with Serbia, actions that are intended to stop the flow of arms, food, and 
supplies to Albanian insurgents.86   
Such missions require teams to work together perfectly, and the uncertain nature of 
peacekeeping operations can sharpen vital decision-making skills.  “Army commanders 
who have returned from the Balkans testify that in small units, such as platoons, troops 
demonstrated overwhelming improvements in their wartime skills while deployed on 
these operations.”87  According to Captain Tom Hairgrove, U.S. Army, the commander 
of Outpost Snapper along the Kosovo-Serbia proper border, skills in conventional tactics 
can be honed in the Balkans:  “Everything we’re doing here–the procedures we follow, 
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the placement of defensive positions, the constant surveillance of the border–are exactly 
as we would do in a defensive position in high- intensity combat.”88  
In such cases, an overlap exists between the skills needed for combat and those 
needed for peace operations.  However, according to the previously cited 1999 
Congressional Budget Office study, the vast majority of Army units surveyed saw few 
such overlaps, as Figure 1 illustrates. 
 
 
Figure 1. Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Training Readiness, by Amount of Overlap 
Between Unit’s Skills for Peace Operations and Conventional War.  (From “Making 
Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in 
Peace Operations,” Congressional Budget Office, December 1999.) 
Personnel in support functions, who do not normally need to sharpen direct 
combat skills, gain significant training from a deployment to the Balkans, as noted in 
Figure 2.  Conducting their jobs in such adverse conditions, these personnel become 
“skilled at levels that cannot be replicated at their permanent bases.”89  Additionally, the 
military’s special forces have been able to practice skills in the Balkans that are expected 
to translate directly to other types of conflict.   
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Peacekeeping operations produce a new cadre of seasoned individuals 
who will prove valuable in any conventional war.  Civil affairs, public 
affairs, psychological operations, special operations, and military police 
personnel all benefit tremendously from the operations in the Balkans.90 
 Figure 2.  Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, by Type of Unit. (From: 
“Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Participation in 
Peace Operations,” Congressional Budget Office, 1999.) 
 
Some also argue that the standards by which readiness is currently measured are 
no longer valid.   
Those stuck in the past complain that duty in the Balkans prevents the 
U.S. military from meeting arbitrary and unrealistic ‘readiness’ standards 
and training schedules that are still geared to repelling Soviet armies at the 
Fulda Gap.91   
Since the threat of massive war with the Soviet Union is no longer relevant, they 
maintain, perhaps it is time to come up with a new standard of measurement.  Certainly, 
those standards worked when the time came to use the Cold War military to defeat Iraq in 
the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.  That military no longer exists, however, and a survey of 
the last decade raises the question of whether new standards are not required.  In that 
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light, perhaps duty in the Balkans is actually ideal training for the future of modern 
combat. 
According to Brigadier General Kenneth Quinlan, U.S. Army, the Commander of 
Task Force Falcon,  
We are getting every ounce of training value here in Kosovo.  Kosovo is 
good for our army, not just good for Kosovo, not just good for the Balkans 
stability.  This is sergeants’ time every day here in Kosovo.  They are in 
charge.  They have live ammunition.  They have an unpredictable threat 
they face every day.  They make decisions on the spot.  You can’t 
replicate that.92 
General Quinlan recognizes that the opportunity cost of developing these individual skills 
is that company and division level skills erode, and he estimates that it will take three 
months for deployed soldiers to regain those skills.  The bottom line, however, is that “if 
his troops were called on to fight…they would be ready to go to war.”93 
B. THE U.S. ROLE  
The debate over peacekeeping effects on readiness is really part of a larger 
dispute over the United States role in the world.  What principles and priorities should 
guide U.S. foreign policy?  Does the United States, as the world’s sole superpower, have 
an obligation to police the world, intervening against aggression and injustice?  Or should 
America restrain itself and only act when its interests are threatened?  The debate has 
continued since the country’s founding.  Barbara Conry characterized the divisions of 
views in the 1990’s as follows: 
One school of thought, loosely associated with the Clinton administration 
and the Democratic Party, advocates exercising U.S. global leadership in a 
multilateral context to advance humanitarian or Wilsonian objectives.  The 
other school of thought, loosely associated with the Republican Party, 
advocates unilateral U.S. leadership primarily for traditional realist–power 
and national security–objectives.94 
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The modern interventionist perspective is often associated with the views of 
President Woodrow Wilson.  After the horrors of World War I, President Wilson sought 
to establish an international organization dedicated to common values and principles.  
The League of Nations was founded on the idea that firm commitments to collective 
security would ensure that such a tragedy would never again befall the world.  The 
United States Senate did not approve ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, a document 
which included the Covenant of the League of Nations, so the League was formed 
without the participation of the United States.  The primary opponent of the treaty, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, feared that it would force the United States to become a 
world policeman. 95  
The debate continued in the 1990’s, with President Bill Clinton’s espousal of an 
activist, ideals-centered foreign policy.  In his first inaugural address, President Clinton 
said,  
When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the 
international community is defied, we will act, with peaceful diplomacy 
whenever possible, with force when necessary. 96   
Pricking the conscience of the “international community” at the time were images of 
suffering in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti.  The results were international efforts to alleviate 
these problems, with mixed success.   
In April 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved Resolution 
751, which established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to provide 
humanitarian aid to the Somalis suffering starvation in the midst of a civil conflict.97  
Under President Bush, United States forces participated in UNSC-authorized Operation 
Provide Relief, which lasted from 15 August 1992 to 9 December 1992.98  On 4 
December 1992, President Bush announced that U.S. forces would be undertaking 
Operation Restore Hope, to provide humanitarian relief and to restore order under the 
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authorization of UNSC Resolution 794, which also authorized the formation of the UN 
Task Force (UNITAF).99  The UNSC authorized the formation of UNOSOM II in March 
1993, which was to take over for UNITAF after the 38,000 UNITAF troops (of which 
28,000 were American) restored order.100 
In this instance, the resolution also called for the building of a secure environment 
throughout the country, and endorsed the objective of rehabilitating Somalia’s political 
institutions and economy.  This was the first time the United Nations Security Council 
sought to interfere so deeply into the affairs of a member state.101  One of the Somali clan 
leaders, Mohamed Aideed, felt threatened by the UNOSOM’s mandate, and his forces 
killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in an ambush in June 1993.  This prompted the UNSC to 
approve Resolution 837, which called for the apprehension of those responsible for the 
soldiers’ deaths.  UNOSOM II forces clashed with Somalis several times, and on 3 
October 1993, 18 Army Rangers were killed and 75 were wounded.  President Clinton 
soon announced that U.S. troops would leave Somalia in March 1994.102  Somalia 
continues to experience extreme unrest, and is not an example of a successful UNSC-
authorized operation. 
The forces operating under UNSC auspices in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Accords 
were equally unsuccessful.  The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had 
been authorized by the UNSC in the spring of 1992 to monitor the ceasefire in Croatia.103  
When violence escalated in Bosnia, the UNSC extended the UNPROFOR mandate to 
include Bosnia.  In August 1992, the UNSC authorized member states to use “‘all 
measures necessary’ to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”104  Despite the 
imposition of no-fly zones and embargoes, UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia did not have 
the resources necessary to enforce their mandate, and instead watched helplessly as Serb 
forces conducted “ethnic cleansing” operations against the Bosniaks.  The turning point 
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in Bosnia came in 1995, as evidence of Serb atrocities mounted and public outcry 
demanded action, eventually resulting in the U.S.-brokered Dayton Accords. 
In Haiti, the United Nations Security Council sought to reinstall the country’s first 
democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  President Aristide had been 
ousted in a coup staged by Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras, resulting in a humanitarian 
crisis in Haiti and a flood of refugees.105  After years of negotiations, the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States (OAS) came to agreement with General Cédras 
on a peaceful transition back to legitimate government and the introduction of a UN 
Mission in Haiti.106  When the mission personnel tried to land on Haiti from the USS 
Harlan County, they were opposed by Cédras supporters.  In July 1994, President Clinton 
announced the formation of a U.S.- led Multinational Force (MNF), authorized by the 
UNSC to restore the Aristide regime to power.107  As a result of last-minute negotiations 
with General Cédras by special envoy Jimmy Carter, the MNF landed with no opposition, 
and Aristide resumed control of the Haitian government.   
This operation was lauded as a triumph of coordinated international action, and a 
victory for democracy over authoritarianism; yet within months of the MNF’s arrival, 
political assassinations marred the reputation of the newly restored government.108  
President Aristide was constitutionally prevented from serving consecutive terms, and his 
successor was widely viewed as a puppet for Aristide and his Lavalas Family Party. 109  
In November 2000, Mr. Aristide was reelected as president with a 92% majority, but the 
elections were tainted and widely considered to be a sham.110  In fact, Representative 
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), then chairmen of the 
relevant House and Senate committees, urged after the election that Aristide not be 
allowed to attend a hemispheric summit meeting in April 2001,111 and millions of dollars 
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in U.S. foreign aid were suspended pending review of the election results.112  Recently, 
opposition party members in Haiti have been jailed, killed and harassed.113  Despite the 
claims of victory for democracy in Haiti, events since 1994 lend little support to such 
beliefs. 
In all of these cases, the common factor is that there was a genuine humanitarian 
crisis–people were starving, or being oppressed or exterminated.  United States leaders, at 
the head of the most powerful nation in the world, felt compelled to act.  In the Balkans, 
President Bill Clinton’s only action after entering office in 1993 was the “lift and strike” 
proposal—to lift the arms embargo and to conduct air strikes to compel the Serbs to cease 
hostilities— made by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, which was soundly rejected 
by European countries with troops in the Balkans.114  President Clinton was reluctant to 
do more, because he feared U.S. entanglement in a long term, convoluted conflict on the 
order of Northern Ireland or Cyprus.115  In 1995, as U.S. troops were preparing to deploy 
a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, President Clinton said,  
my duty as President is to match the demands for American leadership to 
our strategic interests and to our ability to make a difference…. We can’t 
do everything, but we must do what we can. 116   
This sentiment was echoed by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) 
from 1997 to 2000, General Wesley Clark, who said, “If you can make a difference, you 
should.”117 
The seemingly frenetic pace of United States involvement in peace support 
operations can be seen as simply part of a global trend.  Since the United Nations was 
established in 1945, it has authorized fifty-four peace support operations.  Of these, two-
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thirds have been established since Desert Storm. 118  According to Joshua Muravchik, it is 
a “shibboleth that America cannot be the world’s policeman.  In truth, it must be more 
than that.  A policeman gets his assignment from higher authority, but in the community 
of nations, there is no authority higher than America…. America must accept the role of 
world leader.”119  For proponents of this trend in U.S. policy, accepting the role of world 
leader means acting whenever human suffering demands it. 
Critics of this approach view such criteria as missing a crucial factor: interests.  
New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman wrote in 1995: “I don’t give two cents 
about Bosnia.  Not two cents.”120  When the United States became involved in Kosovo, 
Friedman wrote, “The question we are wrestling with in Kosovo today is this: How 
should Americans react when bad things happen in unimportant places?”121  This is a 
rather extreme formulation of the argument, but it brings to light the basic tenet of the 
interests-oriented approach to foreign policy, canonized by the Weinberger Doctrine: 
“Commit only when our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake.”122  Throughout the 
Cold War, such questions were a little easier to answer.  While debate still took place 
about specific interventions, the commonly accepted U.S. interest resided in aggressively 
opposing Communism, and this led to involvement all over the globe.  In the post-Soviet 
international context, with no ideological enemy, it is more difficult to define interests 
justifying intervention.  Many Americans, however, do not see a vital interest in the 
Balkans.  A January 1993 Gallup poll found that only 24% of Americans felt that the 
United States should get involved in Bosnia,123 and an April 1999 Gallup poll showed 
that only 34% of Americans viewed regional ethnic conflicts as critical threats.124 
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The emphasis on vital national interests stems from the nature of the United States 
government.  Because the United States is a democracy, the government is dependent on 
public support to prosecute conflicts.  History has shown that U.S. citizens abhor the 
results of humanitarian crises, and feel the need to “do something.”  When faced with the 
costs of intervention, however, this sentiment has little staying power.125  In the words of 
Charles Krauthammer,   
Americans will support purely humanitarian interventions at the 
beginning.  Americans, more than the people of any other Great Power, 
have long believed that foreign policy must be infused with moral 
purpose, and they are as moved as any people by the plight of others.126   
As the intervention stretches on and casualties ensue, however, this interest wanes. 
This tendency is supported by evidence from Somalia.  Before October 1993, 
Americans supported President Clinton’s handling of Somalia by a factor of two to one, 
but after 3 October 1993, 64% of Americans wanted to pull U.S. troops out.127  By 
contrast, when faced with crises that truly affect vital national interests, the American 
public will be willing to bear the costs of defending those interests.  Examples of such 
cases include both World Wars.  Even in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, despite casualty 
estimates in the thousands, 78% of Americans supported action. 128  Certainly, President 
Clinton’s approach to the Kosovo conflict, in which he publicly refused to consider the 
use of ground forces in combat operations, reflected his belief that the American public 
did not see a vital interest in Kosovo, despite “widespread bipartisan criticism.”129 
Implicit in this argument is what some people call the “body bag syndrome” or 
the “Vietnam syndrome.”  The Weinberger Doctrine was prompted by the U.S. 
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experience in Lebanon, where 241 U.S. Marines were killed in a truck bomb explosion in 
1983.  “The marines, not configured or equipped for combat, were in Lebanon on a 
fuzzily defined peacekeeping mission as what the State Department called an 
‘interpositional force.’”130  The American public knew little of the situation in Lebanon, 
but the consensus was that the mission was not worth 241 American lives.  The same was 
true in Somalia.   
As long as it was a feeding operation, there was popular support.  But as 
soon as it turned into a nation-building operation with real fighting and 
real losses–eighteen Americans in one day–the game was up.  The 
intervention had to be terminated.131 
General Colin Powell’s espousal and interpretation of the Weinberger Doctrine 
resulted from a comparably ill-defined mission in Vietnam, which led to the loss of over 
fifty thousand Americans.  While couched in terms of the Cold War struggle for 
predominance, the exact mission in Vietnam was unclear to many, and the lack of true 
commitment by political leaders led, in Powell’s estimation, to the tens of thousands of 
U.S. casualties that continue to scar the national psyche.   
Many of my generation…. vowed that when our turn came to call the 
shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-
baked reasons that the American people could not understand or 
support.132 
This is not to say that the American people cannot support an operation that 
involves casualties.  But they must be convinced that the cause is worth the loss of 
American lives.  According to Charles Krauthammer,  
This is not, as some have argued, a blanket aversion to casualties, 
stemming variously from a decadence caused by prosperity, or a higher 
valuation placed on children of the smaller families of a low-fertility West.  
It is an aversion to casualties incurred purely for the benefit of 
foreigners.133   
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Regarding the Balkans, the polls have tended to validate the arguments of those who 
argue that the U.S. public has little interest in the region.  “Public skepticism about 
sending our troops to Bosnia is consistent with this…polls have indicated that Americans 
do not believe that U.S. vital interests are at stake, and consequently support for the 
operation is weak.”134 
A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll in December 1995 found that 57% of Americans 
were not confident that the United States could accomplish its goals in Bosnia with few 
casualties.135  In January 1997, 58% of Americans disapproved of the U.S. troop 
presence in Bosnia.136  As mentioned earlier, public support for U.S. involvement in 
Somalia plummeted after U.S. forces took casualties, and a Gallup poll in April 1999 
found that, while 61% of Americans supported NATO air strikes against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, only 31% supported the insertion of U.S. troops.137  When those 
polled were asked why they supported ground troops, 67% chose a “moral obligation to 
help the refugees.”138  However,  
only 14% of Americans say the goal of returning Kosovar refugees to their 
homes with a lengthy military action is worth many American 
casualties…[and] 42% say it is not worth any American casualties at 
all.139   
There is an obvious correlation between American casualties and public support 
for conflicts.  This connection has affected not only the United States leaders in their 
decisions about when to deploy troops, but also the behavior of U.S. troops on their  
deployment.  “And so the watchword for the American troops in Kosovo is ‘force 
protection.’”140  Unlike their international brethren, U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo always 
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wear full “battle-rattle”–Kevlar helmets and body armor, so that they will not be caught 
unprotected.141  This preoccupation with force protection may minimize casualties, but 
some contend that it also interferes with accomplishing the peacekeeping mission.  
According to Peter Maas, a  
reluctance to do the hard work on the ground has hobbled the U.S.- led 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo…Why has this happened?  As in Bosnia, 
aggressive policing could expose the peacekeepers to greater danger, and 
the United States, which calls the shots, does not want any casualties.142 
Thus, the U.S. government has walked a fine line in undertaking deployments to 
the Balkans.  The Clinton administration employed the rhetoric of moral intervention but 
also utilized as much talk of “vital national interests” as it could to garner support for the 
mission.  Aware that the U.S. public would not likely be willing to agree to a long 
commitment, President Clinton said in November 1995 that the peacekeeping 
deployment in Bosnia would last only a year.143  Six years later, the U.S. presence in the 
Balkans has actually expanded in scope and responsibility, and the debate continues.  
In March 1999, as NATO forces were prepared to launch an air war on the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) voiced her 
support for peacekeeping in the Balkans.  Mindful of the “body bag syndrome,” however, 
she proposed only temporary–and casualty-free–involvement.   
I would support a plan that would…put our troops, along with our 
European allies in NATO, together in a peacekeeping mission of a short 
duration which would make sure that things settle down until we could 
have others rotate in and take our place…. I would…support a plan of 
helping the Kosovars, but without putting American troops in harm’s 
way.144   
She wanted to help, but obviously did not see a real or enduring national interest in the 
Balkans.  U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), on the other hand, did.  In April 1999, he 
said,  
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I sincerely believe that Serbia’s assault on Kosovo did threaten our 
interests, and thus its defeat is a cause worth fighting for…. Milosevic’s 
ambitions directly threaten two extremely important American interests: 
our global credibility and the long-term viability of the Atlantic 
Alliance.145 
In October 2000, Presidential nominee Governor George W. Bush, well schooled 
in the traditional conservative view of U.S. application of force, said that he would 
consider using force based on a “strict interpretation of vital national interests.”146 When 
asked during the same debate about the guiding principles for the exercise of American 
force, his Democratic opponent, Vice President Al Gore, said, “I see it as a question of 
values.”147  In these two approaches, competing perspectives on America’s role in the 
world can be seen.  During the last decade, interventionist tendencies have on occasion 
prevailed,148 but the current administration seems to embody aspects of the opposing 
perspective, and this could spell the end of U.S. participation in peacekeeping on the 
ground in the Balkans. 
Part of this debate involves the issue of “nation building.”  The United Nations 
Charter states in Chapter I that the United Nations is “based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members.”149  It also states that  
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state.150   
What, then, should be done in the case of failed states, such as Somalia, or when a 
sovereign state commits crimes against humanity?  The interventionist view holds that, in 
such a situation, the resultant crisis requires a humanitarian intervention in spite of 
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sovereignty issues, as in Kosovo.  It is incumbent upon the United States, the 
interventionist holds, to try to ease the suffering of the people, and to work to build a 
functioning democratic state.   
In contrast, the conservative approach looks first to national interests.  According 
to Henry Kissinger’s critique of such interventions, “There is a tendency to turn foreign 
policy into an attempt to stop humanitarian crises, rather than ask where we will be in ten 
years’ time.”151  Conservatives see “nation building” as an endless task that will not be 
successful, because the people have not reached the stage at which democratic 
institutions can work.  In Somalia, the UNSC-authorized forces tried first to ease 
suffering, then to stop the fighting, and ended up failing miserably.  Conservatives point 
to this example, and to the recent troubles in the Balkans, as proof that the UNSC-
authorized operations in the Balkans are also doomed to failure; the warring factions are 
simply not ready to live together.  As a result of the NATO-led efforts, according to 
Richard Hart Sinnreich, “the Balkans remain on artificial life support.”152 
C. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY  
The debate over the U.S. role in the world is closely related to one about the 
appropriate roles of the U.S. military.  One of the Rice Proposal’s premises is that the 
U.S. military exists primarily to conduct large-scale operations, such as the Persian Gulf 
War.  So, the argument goes, should we be utilizing this force for small-scale 
contingency operations?  According to Colin Powell,  
we must always be mindful of the uniqueness of America’s armed forces.  
We possess the only military in the world that can go anywhere, anytime, 
support ourselves over the long haul, and do it all in an overwhelming and 
decisive manner if need be.  Tying down such forces is often 
imprudent.153   
From this perspective, peacekeeping missions can be seen as a misuse of assets, in 
addition to the previously mentioned arguments concerning lowered readiness. 
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Also, some observers question whether the military demands of Balkan 
peacekeeping are sufficiently elevated to require U.S. soldiers.  In Bosnia, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2001,  
The military job was done three or four years ago.  We still have military 
people in there, and so do our friends and allies.  I have an old-fashioned 
view.  I think that the mission creep from the military role we went in to 
do, has migrated into the civil, what do you call it, police–civil order, I 
guess, is the phrase they use.  And the reason that’s happened is because it 
is a lot easier and cheaper to use American military people than it is to 
take the tougher steps of seeing that the civil order side is developed and 
that there is an opportunity for the military to step away. 154 
In this sentiment, Rumsfeld is not alone.   
As documentary producer Aaron Lukas put it: “What we are seeing in 
Kosovo is social work masquerading as defense policy.”  One senior relief 
official described Kosovo as “the most expensive babysitting operation in 
the world.”… “It’s tactical day–care,” wrote Chicago Tribune reporter 
James O’Shea.  “Soldiers direct traffic, escort people to the grocery store, 
guard churches and mediate disputes between Serbs and Albanians over 
things as mundane as the ownership of an apartment, a tractor, or even a 
cow.”155 
Such tasks do not necessarily fit into the realm of the practical roles for a soldier.   
“Inculcation of the warrior spirit [is] inherently inconsistent with 
successful peacekeeping operations,” pointed out Paula J. Dobriansky, 
Washington Director of the Council on Foreign Relations.  “Waging war 
and maintaining peace require different skills.”  The U.S. Army itself has 
said as much.  A finding of an Army report circulated last September 
[2000] concluded that paratroopers “experienced difficulty tempering their 
combat mentality.”  They were further criticized for their “overly 
aggressive tendencies”–the very instincts essential for surviving [and 
succeeding in] combat.156 
Such assertions are supported by the response of troops trained in civil order 
tasks.  Military police assigned to the Balkans as part of the overall U.S. presence are 
positive about their experiences.   
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Of the roughly 5,600 U.S. troops in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, 
the happiest appear to be the 500 military police.  They are at the center of 
the international effort, patrolling constantly and interacting with the 
population.  The infantry and other combat units, by contrast, tend to hate 
it.157   
The MPs, who are trained to perform exactly the tasks they are performing in Kosovo, 
are much more inclined to approve of the U.S. presence there. 
Some observers, such as Condoleezza Rice, advocate the establishment of a large 
constabulary force, trained in exactly the sorts of civil mission required by peacekeeping 
operations.   
There may be new roles for international forces of a different type when 
civil conflict is well beneath the place that combat forces are needed…. 
We need to think hard about the development of forces that are 
appropriate to police functions.158   
This would allow the United States to withdraw its troops, and would put the job in the 
hands of personnel trained specifically for such a mission.  The problem is that such a 
solution might not actually solve anything.   
Maintaining the peace…might seem more like police work than a military 
mission.  But the United Nations police force, made up of personnel from 
more than 50 nations, is too weak to control Kosovo, and the nascent 
Kosovo police are inexperienced and untested.159   
Aside from weakness and inexperience, the newly formed police in the Balkans 
reportedly have other problems.160  
The United Nations negotiated a contract with a Texas-based corporation, 
DynCorp Technical Services, to hire police personnel.  The results have been mixed at 
best, with U.N. International Police Task Force personnel facing numerous  charges of 
corruption, child abuse, misconduct, sexual impropriety, and trafficking in prostitutes.161  
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DynCorp pays handsomely for civilians to enter such a dangerous zone, and cannot 
afford to be overly discriminating in the face of personnel shortages.  Also, many of the 
members of the UN police mission in Bosnia have diplomatic immunity from prosecution 
in Bosnia, eliminating the threat of punishment for inappropriate behavior–the penalty 
given one U.S. police officer for purchasing the “ownership” of a woman was simply 
dismissal.162  Until a better method of recruiting international constabulary personnel is 
developed, such measures are not likely to provide an enduring solution.  Also, it should 
be noted that the MPs are able to do their jobs with little difficulty only because of the 
presence of armed, reinforced soldiers.  Especially in a region as volatile as Kosovo, an 
MP’s mission to maintain order could easily become impossible without the pacifying 
presence of armed patrols. 
This brings to light a key aspect of the utility of military personnel in 
peacekeeping operations.  “It should be remembered that peacekeeping missions are 
nothing short of military operations–with the potential for combat and loss of life.”163  A 
peacekeeping operation can present a soldier with every task along the spectrum of 
combat, from routine guard duty to high- intensity combat, as recent attacks on 
peacekeepers in Kosovo have shown. 164  While a police or constabulary force can 
perform some of these duties, it has been soldiers who have consistently shown that they 
can operate along the full length of that spectrum. 
Some Americans advocate using the military for peacekeeping duties because 
they have seen such “police missions” as among the conflicts most likely to be 
encountered in the future.  In response to Secretary Rumsfeld’s remarks concerning the 
completion of the “military job” in Bosnia, U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-DE), the 
current Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated,  
From Secretary Rumsfeld’s published remarks, I get the impression that 
he sees anything short of actual combat or the separating of warring 
parties as inappropriate tasks for our soldiers.  If he does, I disagree with 
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him.  In fact, this view strikes me as the old syndrome of “preparing to 
fight the last war.”  The last two so-called “strategic concepts” of NATO 
have made clear that the most likely security cha llenges of the twenty-first 
century will be ethnic and religious strife, trans-national crime, terrorism 
and the like–rather than a frontal attack on the territory of alliance 
members.165 
Finally, while some soldiers are unhappy with the missions and tasks in Kosovo, 
many others enjoy them.  After being part of a training machine without a real enemy 
since the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the opportunity to do something with practical 
application appeals to many.  In the words of Captain Joseph Cantello,  “In the Army, 
you spend practically all of your time training.  Here, we are executing a real-world 
mission.”166  The concrete evidence of the widespread nature of this sentiment is that the 
reenlistment rates in forces deploying to the Balkans are higher than average.  Indeed, the 
1st Armored Division, which has been tasked heavily with operations in the Balkans, has 
the highest reenlistment rate in the Army. 167  While U.S. soldiers have not trained 
extensively to serve in missions such as those in the Balkans, they are doing an excellent 
job, and seem to be proud to do something of value. 
A major element in the debate over the proper role of the U.S. military is the 
structure of the armed forces.  Many of the arguments against the use of the armed forces 
for peacekeeping hinge on the fact that the U.S. military has been structured for more 
demanding purposes, including high-intensity combat.  However, it has been argued that 
the current strategy behind force shaping is out of date, and needs to be revised.  For 
example, according to Michael Casey,   
Currently, the U.S. defense establishment feels that it must maintain 
sufficient forces to fight and win two near-simultaneous major theater 
wars…. This  ‘2 MRC’ [two major regional conflicts] force-sizing 
paradigm is an inappropriate model for the current U.S. strategy as it is 
badly linked to real world threats, is largely unaffordable, and short 
changes the future.168 
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated his desire to review the “2 
MRC” paradigm.   
It seems to me it’s time for somebody in this department to be 
uncomfortable with the fact that we’re parading around with the force 
sizing construct without the forces to fit, and therefore, the behavior 
pattern that is inappropriate to our circumstances.169  
As a result of the numerous criticisms of the military’s current structure, Secretary 
Rumsfeld has commissioned a study by Andrew Marshall, the Director of Net 
Assessment.  While Marshall’s findings are not yet final, they could result in a 
reconfigured military.  Secretary Rumsfeld has long been a proponent of a more 
technologically oriented force, and is also a strong advocate of missile defense.  Such 
priorities are expensive, however, and could come at the cost of force size.  According to 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “at the end of the day, you do have to look 
at personnel.  It’s one of the most expensive parts of what we do.”170  In order to make 
reductions, it is quite conceivable that the scale of U.S. commitments abroad could be 
reduced.  This move could have a large impact on the U.S. military presence in the 
Balkans. 
D. POTENTIAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Another factor that affects the U.S. debate, and ultimately U.S. policy, is the 
composition of the Bush administration.  President Bush has admitted that he lacks 
experience in international affairs.  To correct for this inexperience, he has assembled a 
group of appointees with a vast cumulative amount of experience, including Vice 
President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
Secretary of State Colin Powell is a great asset for the Bush cabinet, but he has a 
reputation for opposition to U.S. involvement in military operations in the Balkans. Over 
the buildup of U.S. forces for the Gulf War, to which General Powell was opposed,  
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the Secretary of Defense had to admonish Powell repeatedly to leave 
political matters to the civilians. ‘You’re not secretary of state,’ Cheney 
lectured him on one occasion.  ‘You’re not the national security advisor 
anymore.  And you’re not the secretary of defense.  So stick to military 
matters.’  But Powell wouldn’t.171  
In October 1992, General Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
wrote a New York Times article about the Balkans, stating,  
Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not 
always possible.  So you bet I get nervous when so-called experts suggest 
that all we need is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack…. The 
crisis in Bosnia is especially complex…one with deep ethnic and religious 
roots that go back a thousand years.  The solution must ultimately be a 
political one.  Deeper military involvement beyond humanitarian purposes 
requires great care and a full examination of possible outcomes.172 
Now, of course, Powell is a civilian, and a tremendously popular one at that.  
When it was announced that he was to be Secretary of State, and that Donald Rumsfeld 
would be Secretary of Defense, many predicted conflict, and it has come to pass over the 
Balkans, among other issues.   
A moderate on domestic and foreign policy issues, President Bush’s 
Secretary of State has emerged as a lonesome dove in an administration 
filled with hawks.  Powell is eager to use his new diplomatic tool kit to 
resolve disputes through negotiations.  But he has been at odds with a 
president and colleagues who prefer a harder line on foreign policy. 173   
Over the Balkans, this divide has manifested itself slowly.  In the past, Powell 
was quite outspoken about his opposition to placing U.S. soldiers at risk for the security 
of the Bosnians, while Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was a proponent of intervention in 
the Balkans as early as 1994,174 and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has 
long “criticized reluctance to use U.S. troops abroad.”175 When Powell was nominated as 
Secretary of State, he soothed worried allies, telling them that  
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We’re not cutting and running…. We’re going to make a careful 
assessment of it [U.S. peacekeeping commitments] in consultation with 
our allies, then make some judgments.176   
He reiterated these assurances at a NATO conference in Brussels in February 2001, 
saying that “we went in together, and we will go out together.”177  
Secretary Rumsfeld was not prompt in supporting those assertions.  At the 
Munich Conference on European Security Policy in early February 2001, he said that the 
United States would “not act unilaterally, or fail to consult with [its] allies.”178  However, 
during a March 2001 press conference with the NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson, Secretary Rumsfeld pointedly ignored a question asked about whether the 
United States would stay the course in the Balkans.179  By May 2001, however, it seemed 
that the specter of U.S. withdrawal from ground force peacekeeping operations was gone, 
and that U.S. troops would be participating in such operations in the Balkans for years to 
come.  Yet, that month, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld advocated the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from peacekeeping in Bosnia because “the military job” in Bosnia “was done three 
or four years ago.”180  However, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with other NATO 
foreign ministers on 29 May 2001 in Budapest, and told them that “The President has 
made a decision on this…. We went into this together, and we’ll come out together.”181  
In August 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld held a defense department briefing, at which he 
discussed Balkan peacekeeping. 
When those forces went in [to Bosnia], they said they’d be out in a year.  
They’re not out in a year.  It’s been five plus…. My concern is that we, the 
armed forces, the Pentagon…do not have the responsibility for developing 
the civil side.  And that’s hard work, it’s difficult work, and it costs some 
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money, and it takes some time…. Now, my attitude about it is that…if the 
United States armed forces can go into a situation…these are war-fighters, 
these aren’t policemen and people who should be sitting there for 20 years 
doing something that somebody else could be doing.  That’s an enormous 
distraction for us.182  
Such statements can only serve to worry America’s NATO allies, while Secretary 
of State Powell has been trying ceaselessly to assuage their anxieties.  Clearly, rifts have 
emerged in the Bush administration, and how the tremors settle out will affect the future 
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IV. THE NATO DEBATE 
 
 
This chapter looks at the issues in a European and NATO context.  It examines 
the evolution in NATO’s identity over the last decade, and the centrality of the Balkans to 
that evolution.  It also surveys the criticality of the United States to the NATO alliance, in 
terms of leadership, credibility and capabilities.  It then considers the question of timing: 
are the current conditions in Europe and in the Balkans conducive to a U.S. withdrawal 
from participation in peacekeeping operations on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo?  
After considering current trends in U.S. strategic policy, including a lessened emphasis 
on Europe (in comparison with Asia and the Middle East), greater investments in missile 
defense, and choices perceived in Europe as signs of unilateralism, the chapter closes by 
examining the potential effects of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
A. EVOLUTION OF THE NATO ALLIANCE 
The possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from participation in peacekeeping 
operations on the ground in the Balkans goes right to the heart of the NATO alliance, and 
is cause for great concern among alliance members due to NATO’s evolving nature.  
When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949, the main premise behind the 
alliance was that of collective defense.  Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stated, 
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all.”183  Article 6 defined the areas in 
which an attack would be deemed an attack on NATO:  
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the 
Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or the islands 
under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north 
of the Tropic of Cancer.184   
The obvious concern was an armed attack on European territory by Soviet forces. 
While the success of NATO’s collective defense strategy in deterring Soviet aggression is 
unprovable, it is a fact that no such aggression took place and that the Cold War ended 
                                                 
183 North Atlantic Treaty, in NATO Handbook: 50th Anniversary Edition (Brussels: NATO Office of 
Information and Press, 1998), p. 396. 
184 Ibid., p. 397. 
50 
without armed combat between the opposing alliances.  In 1991, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, President George Bush said,  
this alliance has been more successful than any of us dared to dream.  It 
was designed to defend our freedom, but in fact it triumphed over 
totalitarianism. 185  
In February 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a former ambassador to 
NATO, called it “the most successful military alliance in history.”186  Yet this success led 
NATO to a crisis:  what was to be NATO’s purpose now that the Cold War had been 
won?187  Collective defense against a powerful Soviet adversary was no longer required, 
and the question arose whether NATO should not go the way of the defunct Warsaw 
Pact. 
NATO’s answer to such questions came with the Rome Declaration in November 
1991.  Since NATO no longer had a specific enemy, it recast itself as “an agent of 
change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members’ security.”188  
Most importantly, the declaration asserted, “our own security is inseparably linked to that 
of all other states in Europe.”189  Thus, NATO, while still a collective defense 
organization, became a vehicle for collective security activities on an ad hoc and selective 
basis in the entire Euro-Atlantic region. 
The first real post-Cold War test for the NATO allies in meeting collective 
security challenges came in the former Yugoslavia.  According to Ian Thomas,  
The experience of Yugoslavia made a poor advertisement for conceptions 
of a European security identity and of NATO as a force for stability.  
Moreover, it did little to enhance confidence that either European 
institutions or NATO could effectively respond to the new types of ethnic, 
religious, or nationalist conflicts that might be let loose in Europe by the 
ending of the Cold War…. When faced with a crisis at the gates of 
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Western Europe, NATO’s political leaders were unwilling to act.  This 
unwillingness, in turn, was perceived as a failure of NATO.190 
As the conflict in Bosnia wore on, NATO had “only limited roles, such as 
embargo and no-fly-zone enforcement and the delivery of humanitarian supplies, while 
the main action on the ground was carried out by UNPROFOR.”191  UNPROFOR’s 
failure to bring a halt to atrocities in the former Yugoslavia reflected poorly on NATO as 
well, and it was not until after the Sarajevo marketplace bombing in February 1994 that 
NATO began to regain credibility.   
When the Bosnian Serbs again defied the no-fly-zone on February 28, 
1994, NATO shot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft.  This was significant 
in NATO’s history as the Alliance’s first use of deadly force; with that act, 
in the words of one analyst, ‘NATO redeemed its credibility’–at least 
temporarily.192  
This credibility was then undermined, however, in November 1994, when  
NATO launched limited air strikes against an airfield in Croatia from 
which Croatian Serbs where flying missions against Bihac, as well as 
against a number of Serb surface-to-air missile sites in Bosnia.  
Subsequent NATO and UN threats of further escalation did not deter the 
Bosnian Serb forces.  To the contrary, the Serbs responded with a series of 
countermeasures, including blockading 200 UN peacekeepers stationed at 
nine weapons collection sites around Sarajevo, detaining 50 Canadian 
troops, and stopping the movement of all other UN military observers 
throughout Bosnia.193 
In May 1995, renewed Serb shelling of UN safe havens went unpunished, and 
NATO forces responded only after the 22 May 1995 Serb seizure of artillery in the heavy 
weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo.194  Bosnian Serbs responded to the NATO 
attacks with additional shelling and also took UN peacekeepers hostage, forcing NATO 
to stop.  In July 1995, Bosnian Serbs took the city of Srebrenica, a UN safe haven, and 
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slaughtered thousands of Bosniaks, “making a mockery of the safe havens concept and 
seriously undermining NATO’s credibility.”195   
To regain control of the situation, NATO undertook a sustained air campaign in 
August 1995 that, combined with a Croatian ground offensive and a vigorous U.S. 
diplomatic initiative, led to the Dayton Accords.196  After three years (1992-1995) of 
shameful war in Europe (the UNPROFOR phase of the conflict), the prospect of peace in 
Bosnia finally lent NATO’s efforts some credibility.  To cement its role as a guarantor of 
European peace, NATO led both the UNSC-authorized Implementation Force (IFOR) 
and the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. 
When ethnic violence erupted again in Kosovo in 1998, NATO’s role as the 
keeper of the peace in Europe was once again called into question.  Compared with the 
response of NATO governments to violence in Bosnia, NATO acted with alacrity, 
commencing bombing in March 1999.  Such deliberate and forceful action was designed 
to erase all doubts about NATO’s determination to prevail.  The Allies used force without 
the authorization of the UN Security Council.  Yet, this action occurred only after 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic ignored repeated warnings and deadlines set by 
leaders of NATO governments.  According to Michael O’Hanlon and Ivo Daalder, 
NATO’s action against Serbia did not erase doubts about NATO, but actually helped 
them to grow.   
NATO stumbled into war, unready either for countering Serbia’s massive 
campaign to forcefully expel much of the ethnic Albanian population from 
Kosovo or to do militarily what it would take to achieve its stated 
objectives…. Operation Allied Force was in its early weeks a textbook 
case of how not to wage war.197   
NATO began a bombing campaign after U.S. President Bill Clinton had already 
dismissed the possibility of sending in troops.  With no threat of an intervention with 
ground troops, the Serbs evidently felt that they could simply out last NATO bombs, and 
during the initial weeks of bombing they accelerated their “ethnic cleansing” in 
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Kosovo.198  When the bombing campaign did not result in the quick victory NATO had 
originally expected, the use of ground forces slowly became a possibility.  In mid-May 
1999, President Clinton decided that “the political costs of failure were greater than the 
political costs of casualties,”199 and began to make a case for ground force operations 
while NATO stepped up the pace and scope of its air strikes.  Yugoslav President 
Milosevic was told about “NATO’s likely invasion plans by Viktor Chernomyrdin during 
the latter’s first visit to Belgrade on May 27.”200  On 3 June 1999, the Serb parliament 
approved a military technical agreement for the withdrawal of Serb military and police 
forces from Kosovo and the deployment of an international force into Kosovo.201  Thus, 
NATO has led the UNSC-authorized Kosovo Force (KFOR), another major task in 
support of collective security. 
On 23-24 April 1999, NATO heads of state and government held a summit 
meeting in Washington, D.C. and approved an updated NATO strategic concept.  While 
reaffirming NATO’s “essential and enduring purpose” of safeguarding “the freedom and 
security of all its members,” the new strategic concept took the initiative of the 1991 
Rome Declaration to a new level. 202  In order to “enhance the security and stability of the 
Euro-Atlantic area,” NATO also adopted the “fundamental security task” of Crisis 
Management:  
To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 
7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention 
and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response 
operations.203   
With its new “fundamental security tasks,” including “partnership” with former 
adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, enshrined in 
official NATO documents, the Alliance has defined its new purposes in the post-Cold 
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War world, purposes whose development came about largely as a result of events in the 
Balkans. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that some Europeans have responded to the 
Rice Proposal with horror.  After a decade of reshaping NATO’s purposes and missions, 
and finally coming to some sort of consensus, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal of 
ground forces from the very region that helped redefine NATO has seemed a betrayal to 
some Europeans.  Such an act was seen as possibly having grave consequences for 
NATO’s future.  British journalist Hugo Young echoed European sentiment over the  
proposal when he said, “I think it would split NATO; indeed, I think it would probably 
end NATO as NATO is now seen.”204 
B. RISK SHARING 
NATO’s acceptance of collective security responsibilities on a selective basis 
during the 1990’s helps in part to explain the European response to the Rice Proposal, but 
there is much more to it, most notably the concept of risk sharing.  The Rice Proposal’s 
“division of labor” would have the European (and Canadian) troops doing all of the work 
on the ground in the Balkans while U.S. forces would provide intelligence and logistics 
support.205  It is true that the United States is the country most capable of supplying such 
support, but it is on the ground that peace is made, and it is there also that troops are at 
risk.  According to Michael Gordon, “Many European allies have been insistent that the 
United States share the risks of Balkan operations.”206   
Risk sharing has been a guiding principle of NATO since its inception, when the 
United States was so committed to defending its European allies from Soviet aggression 
that it was willing to station hundreds of thousands of troops on European soil, to fight 
and die with the European allies if necessary.  Despite the absence of a Soviet enemy, 
risk sharing remains an important aspect of alliance cohesion.  According to a report in 
October 2000,  
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Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary-General, has regularly told visiting 
American congressmen that the Bush proposal could undermine the whole 
idea of “risk sharing, which is precisely the glue that holds the alliance 
together.”207  
The critical role that risk sharing plays in the NATO alliance was demonstrated during 
the last two years of the war in Bosnia, when NATO cohesion was at serious risk.  
According to Robert Hunter, who was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 
1998, 
Europeans have always wondered whether, when the time came, America 
would truly be ‘over here’ in terms of accepting risks for Europe’s 
security.  Even in the post-Cold War era, the principle of sharing risks is 
critical to holding the alliance together.  It was over this precise issue that 
NATO faced its worst-ever internal crisis when, from 1993 to 1995, the 
U.S. sought allied agreement to use NATO air power in Bosnia…. [I]n 
early 1995, Washington finally authorized me to announce to the allies 
that, if UNPROFOR had to be withdrawn under hostile fire, U.S. troops 
would help get them out safely.  Within minutes, allied psychology 
changed; suddenly, the U.S. seemed willing to share risks, even though 
they were only hypothe tical.  In the ensuing period, the European allies 
agreed to NATO’s use of air power, the war ended, the Dayton Accords 
were concluded and the NATO-led Implementation Force, or IFOR, went 
to Bosnia.208 
According to Mats Berdal, a Norwegian analyst at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in London, “The lesson we all drew from Bosnia is that Europeans 
being on the ground and Americans not is a disastrous combination.”209  Risk sharing is a 
vital part of NATO cohesion; and if the United States is unwilling to place its troops at 
risk, the alliance could suffer. 
C. CRITICALITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO NATO 
NATO’s experience in Bosnia also taught the European allies that American 
strength and leadership are truly vital to NATO’s operations.  The United States has 
always been the leading nation in NATO, and if it is unwilling to lead on an issue, NATO 
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tends to founder.  The course of events in Bosnia in 1992-1995 certainly proved this 
point, as U.S.-European disagreements on policy in the Balkans probably contributed to 
the failure of the UNPROFOR intervention and the prolongation of the conflict.  When 
President Clinton’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, went to Europe in May 1993 
to propose “lift and strike,” he said that he was in a “listening mode;” he evidently was 
not prepared to convince the European allies to act decisively.210  The Europeans resisted 
the U.S.-proposed air strikes because they had troops on the ground while the United 
States did not.  It is quite possible, however, that had President Clinton been more willing 
to bring diplomatic pressure to bear, the NATO allies might have been compelled to act.  
However, President Clinton was not prepared to exert such pressure, and the war dragged 
on until mid-1995. 
The importance of American leadership in NATO was proved again in Kosovo.    
In March 1999, President Clinton, having learned a lesson from Bosnia, and with NATO 
and United States credibility on the line, supported the initiation of air operations against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 15,000 feet.  The air campaign lasted much 
longer than estimated.  Despite skeptics, the United States willingness to see it through 
resulted in allied victory.  According to Rob de Wijk,  
Strong American leadership has always been deemed crucial for collective 
defense and as a pacifier to prevent European powers from pursuing risky 
policies…. The Kosovo crisis has demonstrated that warfare requires a 
lead nation which dominates both political and military decision-making 
during the operation.  Fighting a war the democratic way, with nineteen 
member states involved in the decision-making process, undermines the 
effectiveness of the operation.  It leaves the initiative to the adversary, thus 
prolonging the war…. [B]oth NATO’s internal pacifying function and 
heavy crisis response operations require leadership.  At present there is no 
alternative to US leadership.211 
U.S. leadership has been vital to NATO’s operations in the Balkans, but NATO’s 
European members will be unlikely to accept that leadership if the United States is 
unwilling to keep troops on the ground.  According to Lord Roper, a British defense 
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analyst and Liberal Democratic peer, “You can’t not be present and want to call all the 
shots.  Then we really are back to Bosnia in 1992.”212 
U.S. leadership and commitment are particularly vital because, as the last decade 
has shown, the other NATO countries simply do not have sufficient assets to carry out 
some military tasks.   
One problem admittedly is that Europeans talk loudly and carry a tiny 
little stick.  For instance, on October 9 [2000], the Associated Press 
reported that the Dutch government had bravely volunteered 1,000 
peacekeeping troops to the war-torn border regions between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia.  This noble gesture, however, was predicated on a commitment 
from President Clinton that the United States would promise to pull out 
the troops should fighting erupt; the Dutch have no means of doing it 
themselves.213 
The Secretary-General of NATO has acknowledged that European governments 
have limited military capabilities: “Kosovo has made it very clear to everyone that 
Europe might be an economic giant, and it might have real political influence–but when it 
comes to doing the heavy lifting of issues of peace and security, Europe is still not 
pulling its weight.”214  This is true in the more recent Operation Essential Harvest, 
NATO’s operation to disarm Albanian guerrillas in Macedonia.  According to The 
Economist,  
Faced with the prospect of going it mostly alone in Macedonia, the 
Europeans know how much they still need the Americans.  It is not the 
American troops that Europeans want…. Only one American is serving in 
Macedonia’s NATO force—a press officer.  But American logistical 
support supplied via a NATO base in Macedonia, notably in transport and 
intelligence-gathering, is still crucial.215 
As a result of the events of the last decade in the Balkans, the participation of U.S. 
ground forces is vital to the success of NATO operations in the Balkans.   
U.S. troops now serving in Bosnia and Kosovo represent a small fraction 
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of the international peacekeeping force, but they have a disproportionate 
impact in deterring extremists in those countries.  Moreover, the United 
States is the only country that enjoys real credibility and leverage with the 
Albanians and their leaders.216   
The conduct of peacekeepers from France, Russia, and Ukraine has resulted in their 
gaining a reputation in the Balkans as Serb sympathizers.217   
The political and military interventions in the Balkans by European powers in 
1991-1995 failed to contain the violence.  When the Americans led decisive air  
operations in 1995 and in 1999, however, “ethnic cleansing” of Bosniaks and Kosovar 
Albanians stopped, and this correlation has given the U.S. forces extra legitimacy and 
importance.  In the absence of a committed U.S. ground force presence, it is reasonable to 
expect that confidence in the ability of SFOR and KFOR to maintain order would 
seriously erode.  According to Richard Holbrooke, now of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, if the United States withdraws its ground forces, “The rapists, racists, 
demagogues and criminal elements in the Balkans will come back out of the 
woodwork.”218   
Another important U.S. leadership role has to do with Russia’s involvement in the 
Balkans.  NATO was an alliance arrayed against the Soviet Union—a Russian-dominated 
entity—for over forty years.  As a matter of traditional enmity toward NATO and 
national pride (and because NATO enlargement was perceived as threatening Russia’s 
sphere of influence), Russia has refused to place its forces in Bosnia and Kosovo under 
the NATO chain of command.  Michael Gordon writes,  
The Russians have participated in peacekeeping in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo under the aegis of the Americans, in order not to be taking orders 
directly from a NATO general.  If the Americans leave, who manages the 
Russians?219   
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This question is especially important in the wake of NATO’s air operation in the 
Kosovo conflict, which the Russians vehemently opposed.  NATO conducted its 
operation against Serbia without the authorization of the UN Security Council.  Russia 
viewed this act as insulting, as it bypassed Russia’s potential veto as a permanent 
Security Council member, and also as threatening, as NATO’s Kosovo intervention could 
be viewed as a blueprint for possible action in Russia over the Chechnya conflict.220  
Russia subsequently suspended almost all ties to NATO (they were not restored until 
early 2000) and adopted a new Concept of National Security that demonizes NATO.221   
Without U.S. participation in ground force peacekeeping operations, there might 
well be an increased risk that NATO and Russia would be at odds with each other.  In the 
absence of a powerful U.S. presence, a new balance for Russian influence in the region 
would have to be found.  Januzc Bugajski submits that, if the Americans withdraw their  
ground forces,  
the biggest beneficiary will be Moscow…. Under President Vladimir 
Putin, the Kremlin is seeking to reassert its influence in the region, not by 
military muscle but through its oligarchs and criminal business interests 
and its attempts to forge a common front against the alleged Islamic, 
Albanian, and American threats.222  
D. TIMING 
A vital aspect of European misgivings over a possible U.S. withdrawal of ground 
forces from Balkan peacekeeping operations concerns the question of timing.  The 
NATO allies are in agreement that their peacekeepers will eventually withdraw from the 
Balkans, but many feel that now is not the time.  To begin with, the former president of 
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, was removed from power in October 2000, and in June 
2001 he was delivered to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.  Vojislav 
Kostunica, the democratically elected Yugoslav President, is working with the parliament 
to rebuild his country.  In the face of the monumental tasks confronting the peoples of the 
former Yugoslavia, and with continuing ethnic strife, it is unlikely that now would be an 
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auspicious time to pull out the ground forces that are the best-equipped and the most 
conducive to stability.  In Bosnia,  
Pro-western governments exist for the first time at the state level and in 
the Muslim-Croat entity.  But recent events attest to peace’s fragility and 
the need for a credible SFOR presence.  Last month [April 2001] 
international officials were beaten and taken hostage while auditing a bank 
with links to Croatian extremists.  A few weeks ago, ceremonies to mark 
the rebuilding of mosques destroyed in the war were broken up by Serb 
nationalists.  And as more refugees return home, violent incidents 
increase, and local police are often too weak or corrupt to help.223 
According to a publication by the International Crisis Group,  
Contrary to assertions by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the 
job of the military is far from ‘done’…. Abandoning the Dayton agenda 
now would mean consigning the country to a state of simmering unrest 
requiring near-permanent foreign military occupation or, at worst, to a 
renewal of hostilities following its desertion by the international 
community. 224   
There are still many ethnic enclaves throughout Bosnia that wield local control, and their 
influence has made the return of refugees and the reconstruction of civil order quite 
problematic.225  Without the credible presence of SFOR troops, even limited success in 
pursuing the Dayton agenda would be unlikely.  The  SFOR chain of command concurs 
with this judgment..  The official SFOR website contains the following statement:  
For lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, full implementation of the 
military aspects of the Dayton Agreement is crucial.  By continuing the 
implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, NATO 
is helping to ensure a secure environment conducive to civil order and 
political reconstruction. 226   
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A similar condition exists in Kosovo.  The question of Kosovar Albanian 
autonomy was studiously ignored by the 1995 Dayton Accords, and it remained 
unresolved by the 1999 military technical agreement that brought the NATO campaign to 
an end.  But,  
as long as Slobo [Slobodan Milosevic] was in power in Belgrade, 
independence for Kosovo seemed likely and even imminent.  But once he 
was replaced by a constitutional, pro-West regime, everything changed.  
Now the West’s principal goal in the region is to support the fragile 
democracy in Yugoslavia.  Kosovo’s independence might have to wait.227   
As a result, ethnic Albanian nationalists have continued destabilizing guerrilla activities, 
helped by the fact that KFOR initially relied on ethnic Albanian nationalists to serve as 
security forces in Kosovo.   
Albanian nationalism has subsequently bloomed into a destabilizing force.  
NATO has agreed; Western leaders fear that unchecked, [ethnic] Albanian 
radicals in Kosovo and the Macedonian and Serb border areas will carve 
their own Greater Albania out of another ethnic group’s hide.  The 
belligerence could destabilize the region and put NATO’s peacekeepers in 
Kosovo and Macedonia, including 5,600 Americans, in harm’s way. 228   
As a result of ethnic Albanian unrest in Macedonia, NATO actually requested more 
troops for Kosovo, a request that directly contradicted the Rice Proposal.  On 21 March 
2001, “NATO’s top political body, the North Atlantic Council, called…for more 
peacekeeping troops for Kosovo.  But Rumsfeld said no additional American 
peacekeepers would be sent.”229  Despite a plea from Lord Robertson, allied 
governments, taking their cue from the United States, did not send any significant 
reinforcements to Kosovo.230   
The fighting in Macedonia intensified during the spring and summer of 2001.  
Eventually, under heavy pressure from NATO governments, the two main ethnic groups 
                                                 
227 Fareed Zakaria, “Breathing Room In The Balkans,” Newsweek , 22 March 2001, p. 14. 
228 “Our View: Bush Policy Wavers As Balkan Dangers Mount,” USA Today, 22 March 2001, p. 14. 
229 Jonathan S. Landay, “U.S. Hesitance To Send Troops To Balkans Draws Critics,” Ft Worth Star-
Telegram, 22 March 2001, p. 1. 
230 Jane Perlez, “NATO Leader Asks For More Kosovo Troops,” The New York Times, 21 March 
2001. 
62 
in Macedonia (called Slavs and Albanians by most outside observers) signed a cease-fire 
agreement.  On 27 August 2001, NATO forces began Operation Essential Harvest.  The 
NATO operation utilized 4,500 troops to gather weapons from the ethnic Albanian 
National Liberation Army (NLA) and to oversee the cease-fire.231  In accordance with the 
Rice Proposal, U.S. forces were utilized in the operation only in logistics and intelligence 
capacities, not on the ground.232  This is an important development in the implementation 
of some aspects of the Rice Proposal, and indicates some acceptance of the Bush 
administration’s desire to minimize the number of U.S. ground troops abroad in 
peacekeeping operations; but it does not mean that European governments have acceded 
to all of the proposal’s tenets.  Indeed, the fact that such an operation was necessary 
points to the extreme delicacy of the ethnic balance in the Balkans, and reinforces the 
European argument for a continued U.S. ground force presence in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
It also vindicates certain assessments made by the United States and its NATO 
allies in the early 1990’s.  Ethnic Albanian nationalism was the key to the wider Balkan 
war scenario that made the Balkans such a threat to European stability in 1991.  The 
reason why President George Bush issued his “Christmas warning” in December 1992–
and why President Bill Clinton reiterated it in 1993–was that  
the United States and its European allies recognized that Kosovo was a 
powder keg in the middle of a highly volatile region.  With Albanians 
living in at least four countries (Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and 
Yugoslavia), anything that stoked Albanian nationalism could be highly 
destabilizing.233   
Most worrisome was the possibility that Greece and Turkey could end up embroiled in 
the conflict.  Both countries are members of NATO, but they are also long-time rivals; 
and an expansion of Albanian nationalist violence could result in a rift within NATO.234  
Such a possibility is even more likely now than in the early 1990’s, contributing to the 
European view that the time is not ripe for a U.S. withdrawal of ground forces. 
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E. STRATEGIC SHIFTS 
European concerns over a possible withdrawal of American troops have been 
exacerbated by the emphasis that the Bush administration and the Defense Department in 
particular have placed on Asia.  Given Russia’s current political and economic weakness, 
China has been viewed by the Bush administration as a potential “s trategic competitor” 
of the United States.  “The Bush administration has already expressed its intention to 
focus U.S. military might more sharply on national security threats emanating from 
Asia.”235  On 30 August 2001, Army Secretary Thomas E. White hinted that U.S. troops 
might be “redeployed from Europe to Asia to serve as a hedge against potential conflicts 
there.”236  For Europeans concerned with the reliability of U.S. commitments to Europe, 
such hints spell trouble.  According to a British journalist,  
If defense spending is about fighting wars, then the wars the United States 
expects to wage, or hopes to deter, will be Pacific-specific.  Europe in so 
far as it furrows foreheads, will have to take care of itself…. Put simply, 
the Pentagon is reprioritizing the threat list…. China, in Rumsfeld’s own 
words, is where the potential threat lies.237 
Another aspect of the European debate concerns United States plans for a ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) system and a growing sense of U.S. unilateralism.  In January 
1999 the Clinton administration initiated development of what it called a National Missile 
Defense (NMD) system–a modest capability oriented toward the small numbers of 
missiles that rogue states were projected to acquire, in contrast to the Reagan 
administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983-1989.  NMD’s purpose would be to 
protect the United States from ballistic missiles launched by “rogue” countries such as 
Iraq or North Korea.  After the NMD prototype failed in a test in July 2000, President 
Clinton in September 2000 deferred decisions on its future to the next president, who 
turned out to be George W. Bush, a strong proponent of strategic missile defenses.  
Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has been perhaps an even stronger 
proponent, and new plans to develop missile defense systems were soon underway.  
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U.S. strategic missile defenses have been a subject of great concern for 
Europeans.  “A missile shield, they (notably the French) say, would unite nations such as 
China, North Korea, and Russia to amass more nukes and thereby threaten the stability of 
Europe.”238  Europeans also fear closer ties between China and Russia.  To some extent 
this fear has become a reality in the wake of the new Russia-China strategic 
partnership.239 
Missile defense is at the very core of Europeans’ uneasiness about the 
United States.  They fear that a system designed to protect the United 
States from missiles will destroy the very underpinnings of the NATO 
alliance, the idea of a shared defense against a common threat, by creating 
the old dream of fortress America.240 
Indeed, such plans would seem to be right in line with the Rice Proposal. 
European fears in this regard seem to have been reinforced by the Bush 
administration’s handling of several international policy issues.241  President Bush 
refused to back the Kyoto agreement on climate control (a protocol which the U.S. Senate 
had already rejected by a vote of 95-0) despite broad European support, and negotiated an 
arms deal with Taiwan despite broad disapproval.  He also refused to support a draft 
agreement on verification of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, saying that it 
would not enhance U.S. national security or provide for effective verification of BWC 
violations.  Finally, President Bush has repeatedly expressed his willingness to develop a 
missile defense system regardless of Russia’s stance on renegotiating or replacing the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.   
The general European feeling in March 2001 was that “The conflict over missile 
defense, but also over climate control and questions of world trade, has to be seen in the 
context of a U.S. unilateralism which the Bush-Cheney administration appears to pursue 
as a new doctrine.”242  Such sentiments have not been limited to European governments.  
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An International Herald Tribune survey conducted in August 2001 found that over 70% 
of the people in Britain, France, Germany and Italy felt that the President Bush “makes 
decisions based entirely on U.S. interests.”243  In May 2001, when the United States was 
voted out of the United Nations Human Rights Commission,  
the message was clear.  The embarrassing snub to the United States could 
be attributed to a seeming absence of ‘dialogue and respect’ in the Bush 
administration’s approach to the outside world.244   
Again, such behavior as a context to the Rice Proposal tends to reinforce European fears 
of a U.S. withdrawal of ground forces from peacekeeping in the Balkans. 
Yet, in spite of seeming U.S. unilateralism and possible complications as a result 
of U.S. missile defense plans, dialogue is increasing on the topic, in part because the 
Bush administration abandoned the Clinton administration term “National Missile 
Defense” soon after taking office, and instead refers to it as “missile defense.”  “Kim 
Holmes, a foreign policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, said he found…that 
opposition from officials and analysts in Europe weakened appreciably when the  
‘national’ was dropped from NMD discussions.”245  When the United States began to 
include its European allies in its vision of a missile defense (MD) concept, opposition 
from European governments began to lessen.  Since both Secretary of State Colin Powell 
and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have stated that the United States would not 
unilaterally withdraw from the Balkans,  
cracks in the once-solid skepticism of NATO’s European allies have been 
widening noticeably…. Javier Solana, the former NATO Secretary-
General, who now sets security policy for the European Union, told 
reporters in Washington that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty … ‘is 
not the Bible.’… Lord George Robertson, Mr. Solana’s successor as head 
of NATO, told a news conference in Brussels yesterday [5 February 2001] 
that ‘there has to be an acceptance that the decision on missile defense was 
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made in the U.S. presidential election.’246 
This acceptance has grown, as the Bush administration has worked with Russia to 
formulate a new regime for MD, with some success.  European support for U.S. missile 
defense plans has grown, in part due to the Bush administration’s efforts at rallying 
support, but also as a result of the apparent abandonment of the Rice Proposal. 
F.   POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 11 
SEPTEMBER 2001 
Recent events have influenced NATO European perceptions of international 
security requirements, with potential implications for the Rice Proposal.  The 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were acts 
of war against the United States.  Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda terrorist network stands 
accused of the worst terrorist attack in history, an attack that, according to initial 
estimates, cost almost 5,000 innocent lives.  Bin Laden is reputed to have been in 
Afghanistan for years, running terrorist networks that purportedly planned the February 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the June 1996 attack on a U.S. military complex in 
Saudi Arabia, the August 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 
October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. 247  The 11 September 2001 attacks were 
the most extensive such assaults on U.S. soil, however, and the response by the United 
States has been vigorous.   
Soon after the attack, the U.S. government began “deploying thousands of special 
operations forces and dozens of helicopters into the region around Afghanistan.”248  As 
of 3 October 2001, there were over 30,000 U.S. troops in the region, including a Marine 
Amphibious Ready Group, three Naval Carrier Battle Groups, infantrymen from the 
Army’s 10th Mountain Division and massive air power.249  As of 10 October 2001, over 
twenty-seven thousand Reserves and National Guardsmen had been called to active 
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duty,250 as part of an expected mobilization of up to fifty thousand.251  With such troop 
movements, it would not be surprising to see U.S. troops redeployed from the Balkans. 
In October 2001, an unnamed Pentagon official was quoted as saying that “troops 
for any operation in Afghanistan would certainly be pulled from the 10,000-strong US 
peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.”252  Troops in the Balkans are closer to 
the region, and have already received all the training and certification necessary for 
deployment to a battle zone.  For these reasons, aside from geographical proximity, they 
could be sent to Afghanistan more quickly than some stateside troops.253  Additionally, 
U.S. troops in the Balkans have what could prove to be valuable peacekeeping 
experience.  It is hoped that the war against terrorism will result in the downfall of the 
Taliban, the Islamic fundamentalist group which currently controls Afghanistan.  If this 
occurs, the United States will likely have an interest in helping Afghanistan to rebuild.  
The troops in the Balkans, who have been helping parts of the former Yugoslavia rebuild, 
could be invaluable assets in such an undertaking.  U.S. troops in the Balkans, given their 
location and expertise, are remarkably well suited to serve in Afghanistan. 
NATO’s response to the terrorist attacks could facilitate decisions by the United 
States to move U.S. peacekeepers from the Balkans to Afghanistan.  The day after the 
attacks, NATO invoked the collective defense pledge in Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty for the first time in history, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) confirmed on 2 
October 2001 that the attacks were from a source outside the alliance, and therefore 
covered by Article 5.254  As a result, the NAC authorized the use of NATO assets in the 
retaliation against Osama bin Laden, including 5 AWACS aircraft and the nine ships of 
the Standing Naval Forces, Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).255  American and 
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British forces launched retaliatory strikes against Taliban and Al Queda targets in 
Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, and Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Turkey have all pledged military assistance, and some even ground forces.256   
Additionally, NATO allies agreed on 4 October 2001 to take measures to “expand 
the options available in the campaign against terrorism.”257  Of paramount importance to 
the Rice Proposal was the NAC’s decision to “backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s 
area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against 
terrorism.”258  Some observers have construed this statement as, essentially, blanket 
permission for the United States to pull its troops from the Balkans for use in 
Afghanistan.259 
The importance of the NATO alliance to the United States could also be called 
into question.  According to German journalist Nikolas Busse, 
This new harmony in transatlantic ties may…soon give way to a much 
more sober appraisal.  Once the first battles against terrorism have been 
fought in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Europeans may swiftly discover 
that U.S. security interests have shifted.  That will affect NATO first and 
foremost.  Even before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, Washington was showing more interest in Asia than in Europe.  
That interest now seems likely to be joined by greater concern with the 
Middle East and with terrorism all over the world.  The defense of Europe, 
still officially one of NATO’s main purposes, will slip another few places 
further down in the list of U.S. priorities.  In the war against international 
terrorism and their modern methods of organization, the United States will 
collaborate with many governments.  Its European allies will be just some 
of many possible partners.260 
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Retaliation for the terrorist attacks is an issue of extreme importance to 
Americans, shocked by the terrorists’ audacity and angered by the murder of so many 
innocent fellow citizens.  Foreign policy was not considered important during the 2000 
presidential election, but now Americans are eager to exact justice and revenge.  
According to a 7 October 2001 ABC-Washington Post poll, 94% of Americans support 
military action against Afghanistan, with 80% extending that support to the use of U.S. 
ground forces.261  With such strong support for action, it is quite possible that the 
Atlantic Alliance could dwindle in the eyes of an American public that has not been 
interested in European security issues since the end of the Cold War. 
The terrorist attacks have also enhanced the importance of missile defense.  While 
the attacks in New York and Arlington did not utilize missiles, they have renewed 
interest in homeland defense, in which missile defense plays a large part.  President Bush 
created a new cabinet- level Office of Homeland Security, whose head, former 
Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, was sworn in on 8 October 2001.262  Americans felt 
very insecure in the wake of the attacks, and missile defense, already an issue of great 
importance to the Bush administration, began to receive even more attention.  As a result, 
it is likely that the support of the European allies will not be seen as an important 
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This chapter attempts to assess the impact of the domestic and international 
factors on the fate of the Rice Proposal.  It surveys the domestic factors that brought the 
proposal to light, and considers the international factors that likely caused its near-
demise.  It then reviews the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States, and assesses their implications for the possible renewal of the Rice 
Proposal. 
A. PRESIDENT BUSH IN KOSOVO 
On 24 July 2001, President Bush went to Kosovo.  At Camp Bondsteel, he met 
with troops, signed a defense spending bill, and told soldiers there that his goal was  “to 
hasten the day when peace is self-sustaining, when local democratically elected 
authorities can assume full responsibility and when NATO forces can go home.”263  
While these words might seem to be in line with the spirit of the Rice Proposal, they are 
not.  President Bush did not single out U.S. forces, but discussed them as part of a NATO 
force that will remain in the Balkans until peace is “self-sustaining.”  There have been 
important steps towards peace in the region, but it is far from peaceful.  President Bush 
went on to say,  
We understand that America’s contribution is essential, both militarily and 
politically.  We will not draw down our forces in Bosnia and Kosovo 
precipitously or unilaterally.  We came in together, and we will go out 
together.264   
Bush again urged the European NATO allies to shoulder more of the peacekeeping 
burden, but his statements signaled a commitment to keeping U.S. troops in the Balkans 
for quite some time. 
 These words from President Bush came just a month after Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld said that KFOR and SFOR troops provided a “very valuable 
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contribution” to stability in the Balkans.265  These statements, in conjunction with 
continued assurances by Secretary of State Colin Powell, gave the impression of an 
administration in agreement; and the Rice Proposal appeared to be dead.  Operation 
Essential Harvest provided a possible blue print for future peace support operations in 
Europe–with European troops on the ground in Macedonia and U.S. forces supplying 
intelligence and logistics support–but the complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces 
from peacekeeping operations in the Balkans seemed an unlikely prospect, at least until 
11 September 2001. 
B. DOMESTIC IMPETUS 
This is not surprising, given how the proposal came into being.  Domestic factors 
caused the articulation of the Rice Proposal, beginning with the 2000 presidential 
debates.  It had long been a Republican view that the Clinton administration had 
undermined military readiness by sending U.S. troops all over the globe for peacekeeping 
missions.  In fact, the 2000 Republican National Platform stated,  
In the last eight years the administration has squandered the opportunity 
granted to the United States by the courage and sacrifice of previous 
generations…. The administration has run America’s defenses down over 
the decade through inadequate resources, promiscuous commitments, and 
the absence of a forward- looking strategy. 266 
Additionally, the Republican- led 106th Congress stated in a summary of its 
accomplishments, 
While the Congress last year addressed critical problems with recruitment 
and retention, this year’s annual defense bill offers solutions to serious 
readiness and quality-of- life issues that have plagued our military under 
the Clinton-Gore years.267   
With such a history of opposition to peacekeeping commitments among 
Republicans, the Rice Proposal was not an entirely new concept.  However, its 
elucidation appears to have been a response to an apparent misstatement by Governor 
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Bush during the 12 October 2000 presidential debate.  When Governor Bush said that it 
ought to be “one of our priorities with our European friends to convince them to put 
troops on the ground,” it sounded as if he had no idea that European allies supplied four-
fifths of the peacekeeping troops in the Balkans.268  It seems likely that the Rice Proposal 
came about as a way to remedy that, with Condoleezza Rice assuming the role of 
explaining exactly what the Governor meant to say.  The Rice Proposal could have been 
simply an ad hoc way of attempting to illustrate that the possible misstatement was 
actually part of a well thought-out plan.  If this was indeed the case, it should be no 
surprise that the Rice Proposal was not fully implemented as policy. 
Domestic election politics may have also played a role in the Rice Proposal’s 
genesis.  At the time of the proposal, Governor Bush and Vice President Gore were neck-
and-neck in the polls (Governor Bush was barely ahead of Vice President Gore, 44% to 
42%).269  Despite this overall deadlock, it was reported in October 2000 that “Bush’s 
support in the Midwest, a key electoral battleground, has eroded sharply.  Gore now leads 
Bush in that vote-rich area by a 43%-38% margin.”270  According to The Times of 
London, this poll shift likely prompted the Rice Proposal: 
Mr. Bush is playing to the American Midwest where, unusually, this race 
will be won or lost.  He has sought to turn Mr. Gore’s internationalist case 
that the US cannot evade its responsibilities as a superpower into a 
potential vote-loser.271 
C. DOMESTIC APATHY 
Governor Bush’s calls to bring home troops from such a faraway, little-known 
place to their families might have gained him some ground in the Midwest, but 
Americans in general were not that interested.  In fact, foreign policy is simply not 
important to most American voters.  According to Eric Black,  
the end of the Cold War knocked foreign policy from the top rank of 
presidential campaign issues…. In polls, domestic issues such as 
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education, health care, taxes, entitlement reform and the country’s moral 
condition all rank higher on voters’ list of concerns.272 
A 12 March 2000 Gallup poll confirmed this; it found that foreign affairs ranked eleventh 
in importance to Americans, behind issues such as education, ethics, crime, taxes, social 
security, health care and drugs.273  Closer to the presidential election, a 26 July 2000 
Gallup poll found that only 58% of Americans felt that foreign policy was either 
“extremely important” or “very important,” compared with 89% for education, 86% for 
the economy, 84% for health care and 82% for social security. 274  Foreign policy gets 
some media airtime during presidential campaigns, but the domestic issues that can affect 
people directly are usually of higher importance to voters. 
Because of this tendency, continued U.S. troop participation in peacekeeping 
missions in the Balkans can be seen as ye t another example of continuity in foreign 
policy.  Johanna McGeary writes that  
every administration learns–often the hard way–that foreign policy 
inevitably snaps back from the campaign rhetoric to the well-plowed 
tracks of enduring interests.275   
Such a shift from rhetoric to reality occurred during the ascension to power of President 
Clinton.  On the campaign trail, Governor Clinton said that he would not return fleeing 
Haitians to their troubled country as long as it was ruled by a military dictatorship.  Once 
he was in office, however, the possibility of hundreds of thousands of Haitian refugees 
forced him to reconsider his position, and he continued with President Bush’s policy of 
returning refugees.276  With regard to the Balkans, Governor Clinton criticized the Bush 
administration’s inaction in the face of “the deliberate and systematic extermination” of 
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the Bosniaks, and vowed that he would call in air strikes to stop Serb aggression. 277  As 
president, however, he followed his predecessor’s policy until 1995. According to Robin 
Wright, 
Foreign policy is traditionally the area in which the least change occurs 
from one administration to another.  ‘Every new administration comes in 
and wants to review policy and take a fresh look and come to its own 
conclusions.  But the reality that they ultimately confront is that U.S. 
interests don’t change and the constraints don’t change, and therefore 
you’re often working within a narrower band of options than it looks from 
the outside,’ said Samuel ‘Sandy’ Berger, Clinton’s national security 
adviser.278 
Despite campaign rhetoric, the realities of the international arena, combined with 
domestic voter apathy, often result in continuity in foreign policy. 
D. INTERNATIONAL REALITIES 
In the case of the Rice Proposal, international realities assailed the Bush camp 
immediately following the 21 October 2000 New York Times interview.  European 
leaders and journalists were aghast at the prospect of a U.S. troop withdrawal, especially 
considering the relative size of the U.S. contingent.  So worried were they that Lord 
Robertson, NATO’s Secretary General, felt compelled to call the Bush campaign 
headquarters to verify that U.S. troops would not be immediately pulled out under a Bush 
administration. 279  It seems likely that Governor Bush and his aides were not prepared for 
the torrent of negative response to the proposal, and it also appears that they had not fully 
considered its impact on the NATO alliance.  After the initial response to the proposal, 
Governor Bush’s advisers did a lot of explaining and reassuring, and the Bush 
administration worked hard to demonstrate that the United States would be a reliable ally.  
When President-elect Bush announced his selection of Colin Powell as Secretary of State, 
he said that his foreign policy would be guided by six principles, and the first was 
“working with allies in Europe and the Far East to extend peace.”280  On 18 December 
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2000, Condoleezza Rice said in an ABC interview, “Bush is the man who believes that 
overtaken obligations must be respected.”281   
This emphasis on alliances and obligations continued through July 2001, when 
Secretary of State Powell said, 
We will do everything that’s necessary to make sure that our alliances 
remain strong and vibrant.  We’re going to be very, very involved on the 
world stage and playing the role that is expected of the United States.282   
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed this sentiment: “Alliances are very 
important to the United States.  We recognize as a country the importance of these 
linkages.”283  In order to prove that the administration recognizes the importance of 
alliances, and of NATO in particular, U.S. ground troops simply had to remain active in 
peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. 
E. MISSILE DEFENSE 
At least until 11 September 2001, it could be argued, a significant reason for 
continued U.S. ground force participation in Balkan peacekeeping missions was the issue 
of missile defense.  As a journalist pointed out in early September 2001, “In a way not 
anticipated before the election, national missile defense lies at the heart of Bush’s 
conception of the world and that of his many like-minded advisers.”284  Missile defense 
was one of many issues during the presidential campaign, but during the period prior to 
11 September 2001, it appeared to have become President Bush’s “one cherished foreign 
policy.   
“It comes directly from the President,” says a State official.  “He’s asking 
every day, ‘How’s it going?  What progress is there?’ It colors everything 
else in the…portfolio.”285 
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The newly published Quadrennial Defense Review, delivered to Congress at the end of 
Fiscal Year 2001, gives Homeland Defense the most emphasis.  “The highest priority of 
the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies.”286 
For the Bush administration, this priority includes missile defense as the entering 
argument.  Many European experts and officials were frightened by this devotion to 
missile defense, however, and they questioned its compatibility with America’s 
commitment to its allies.  To allay these fears, the administration said it would include 
U.S. allies and security partners under the shield as well as all areas where U.S. troops are 
stationed.287  It also promised to “come out together” from the Balkans.  The Rice 
Proposal appeared to have been abandoned to soothe allies and pave the way for 
agreement on missile defense. 
F. VIOLENCE IN THE BALKANS 
A final factor in the apparent demise of the Rice Proposal was the escalation of 
ethnic violence in the Balkans.  While the Rice Proposal might have been a possibility in 
October 2000, when violence was moderate, by February 2001, “The crisis in 
Macedonia…compelled the administration to accelerate reconsideration of its Balkan 
policies.”288  The rising tide of violence between ethnic Albanian nationalists and 
Macedonian forces led to clashes between guerrillas and KFOR troops, as they tried to 
stop arms and personnel from crossing the Kosovo-Macedonia border.289  In addition to 
the more acute military necessity, American credibility in negotiations also came into 
demand.   
The Albanians believe that only Western diplomatic intervention can 
salvage an agreement, placing their trust in the Americans while privately 
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disparaging the EU as anti-Albanian. 290 
During his visit to Camp Bondsteel in July 2001, President Bush acknowledged 
that the violence in the Balkans was not over: “Ethnic extremists are still stoking the 
flames of intolerance and inciting violence.”291  While the Rice Proposal apparently came 
about as a result of domestic politics, the violence in the Balkans, coupled with U.S. voter 
apathy, and pressures within the NATO alliance, especially in the context of the Bush 
administration’s missile defense ambitions, sounded its death knell—until 11 September 
2001. 
G. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 TERRORIST 
ATTACKS 
The unprecedented attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
galvanized U.S. public opinion and garnered near-universal support for the Bush 
administration’s political-military response, opening a new door for the rebirth of the 
Rice Proposal.  Prior to the attacks, a U.S. withdrawal from ground force responsibilities 
in the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans seemed militarily and politically impractical; 
but in the midst of a global war on terrorism, such a withdrawal seems imminent.  The 
troops in the Balkans may be likely candidates for redeployment to Southwest Asia: they 
are closer to the region than troops in North America; and they are eminently qualified by 
their “nation-building” experiences in the Balkans to help rebuild Afghanistan in the 
event of a collapse of the Taliban government.  The NATO allies of the United States 
have pledged to “backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are 
required to directly support operations against terrorism,”292 a statement interpreted by 
many to indicate that NATO allies will replace any U.S. troops that are redeployed from 
the Balkans.   
Despite this support, some observers in Europe fear that the size of the coalition 
being formed against terrorism, and the resources that the  Bush administration has been 
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dedicating to the war on terrorism could undermine the importance of the NATO alliance.  
The terrorist attacks and their consequences have taken the top position in world news, 
making violence in the Balkans seem a secondary matter at best.  The United States 
public is eager to respond to the homeland defense challenge, paving the way for rapid 
development of missile defense systems regardless of international support.  As the first 
six months of the Bush administration showed, there are many compelling reasons for the 
United States to continue its ground force presence in the Balkans.  The 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks, however, have created compelling reasons to consider dedicating 
these forces to other purposes.  While U.S. troops have not yet been taken from the 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has analyzed the Rice Proposal.  Apparently articulated as a rapid 
response to Governor George W. Bush’s evident misstatements during the 2000 
Presidential campaign, the Rice Proposal called for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces 
from peacekeeping missions in the Balkans; it argued that America’s European allies 
should assume a greater share of the ground force peacekeeping role.  This proposal did 
not come out of the blue; it was representative of a largely Republican dissatisfaction 
with the activism of the Clinton-Gore years and conviction that U.S. military readiness 
had been reduced by participation in such missions.  This proposal might have been 
popular with Americans wary of long term peacekeeping commitments—especially in 
such a remote location as the Balkans—but America’s European allies in NATO were 
quite concerned. 
The end of the Cold War destroyed the bipolar world in which NATO existed 
from 1949 to 1989, and the 1990’s saw NATO seek new roles that would continue its 
relevance into the post-Cold War world.  One of these new roles has been acting on a 
selective and ad hoc basis in support of collective security in Europe, and NATO’s forays 
into this realm have centered on the Balkans.  NATO’s initial efforts in 1992-1995 were 
limited to activities such as no-fly-zone and embargo enforcement.  With American 
leadership in Operation Deliberate Force (1995) and Operation Allied Force (1999), 
NATO forces were vital to the cessation of hostilities in both Bosnia and Kosovo.  NATO 
has subsequently led the peacekeeping forces in both of those regions.  In European eyes, 
the Rice Proposal threatened the future of these peacekeeping missions, and therefore 
threatened European security.  European NATO allies also have provided about four-
fifths of the troops in the Balkans, and have viewed the U.S. contribution as relatively 
small in size and cost.  For these reasons, and because NATO’s political cohesion is 
based on risk sharing, the European response to the Rice Proposal was immediate and 
negative. 
Because of that response, the Bush campaign team almost immediately stepped 
away from the proposal, telling the NATO Secretary General that there would be no 
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unilateral withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.  Governor Bush’s advisers continued to 
voice soothing messages that continued after Bush became the U.S. president.  The Bush 
administration was persistent in explaining that it wanted to reduce the number of U.S. 
ground troops in the Balkans, but it was equally persistent in promising that any such 
reductions would occur on the basis of consultations with allies.  This willingness to 
work with allies became even more prominent as violence resurged in the Balkans, 
notably in Macedonia.   
Cooperation with allies became a key tenet of the Bush administration as its 
priorities emerged—with missile defense right at the top.  In an effort to allay European 
fears, President Bush personally told U.S. troops in Kosovo that their presence in the 
Balkans was politically and militarily necessary, and that they would remain there for 
some time.  The importance of the NATO alliance, President Bush’s policy priorities, the 
comparatively small size of the U.S. ground force presence in the Balkans, and domestic 
apathy regarding foreign relations had combined by July 2001 to stop the Rice Proposal 
from becoming a reality. 
The events of 11 September 2001 served to change perceptions of that 
combination of factors, however.  The period following the terrorist attacks has seen an 
angry American population eager to respond, an American president willing to go to 
great lengths to obtain justice, and NATO allies that are apparently willing to acquiesce if 
the U.S. response requires the redeployment of U.S. peacekeepers from the Balkans.  In 
such circumstances, the resurrection of the Rice Proposal seems quite likely, especially 
for an administration that was eager to remove U.S. troops from the Balkans to begin 
with.  A case could easily be made for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. ground forces 
from peacekeeping in the Balkans.  Such a case, however, should not be made. 
The 11 September terrorist attacks were horrible and atrocious, and they demand 
the response of Operation Enduring Freedom.  However, except for the abrupt demise of 
U.S. public apathy about international policies, the terrorist attacks have  changed none of 
the factors that have in recent weeks compelled the United States to continue its ground 
force presence in the Balkans.  The fact remains that the U.S. contingent is still relatively 
small in terms of both personnel and cost.  NATO is still an extremely important 
alliance—the most successful and enduring military alliance in history, and one based on 
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the interests and values shared by the United States and its allies in Europe and North 
America.  NATO will not function well as an alliance without U.S. leadership, and the 
United States cannot lead if it does not have troops on the ground, sharing risks with the 
other allies.   
Most Americans still know little about the Balkans, and unless U.S. forces in the 
Balkans begin taking serious casualties, they are unlikely to voice any strong opinions 
about keeping or withdrawing troops.  The Balkans are nonetheless still vital to NATO’s 
identity and to European stability.  The Balkans are still unstable, and therefore the future 
of European stability remains in question.  In October 2001, Major General H Steven 
Blum, commander of the 29th Infantry Division of the Virginia Army National Guard and 
head of NATO forces in the northeast sector of Bosnia, offer the following judgment: 
“Until you re-establish rule of law here, you can’ t reduce the military presence…. 
Leaving now would be like quitting after 25 miles of a marathon race.”293 
NATO allies were among the very first nations to voice support for America after 
the terrorist attacks, and the North Atlantic Council promptly invoked Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty.  NATO allies have agreed to a set of measures in support of the U.S.-
led campaign against terrorism, and some have already supplied air and naval assets to 
assist American forces.  The solidarity of NATO allies has reinforced the bonds built 
over the previous fifty years.  It must also be noted that the European Union is 
comparable in economic weight to the United States, and that, despite the fact that not all 
NATO members are also members of the EU, American engagement in the NATO 
alliance helps Europe and the United States work together rather than against each other.   
America is at war and intends to defeat terrorism.  Thousands of troops are 
deploying and thousands of reservists are being called up to active duty.  The U.S. forces 
on the ground in the Balkans are not vital to the war against the Al Queda terrorist 
network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but they are vital to European security 
and to NATO’s political cohesion.  For these reasons, they should remain on duty in 
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. 
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